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A BSTRA CT
As industrialized nations, particularly the United States, continue to rely on oil to
support their standard of living and production, the Middle East increases as a strategic
location. Ethics and Foreign Policy Decisions: Iran-Contra - United States-Iraq
Interaction, 1988-91 explores the ethics of policy making which employ the 'many
hands' and 'dirty hands' approach. The Iran-Contra affair and United States-Iraq
interaction from 1988-91 are used as case studies. Suggestions for counteracting the
usage o f the 'many hands' and 'dirty hands' practices are discussed. These suggestions
include real communication and accountability for the many players involved in decision
making and reflection and critique of possible institutional coercive actions, among others.
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IN T R O D U C T IO N

Foreign policy directs the course of action between nations. It establishes trade
practices, aid programs, diplomatic relations, and responses to hostile actions. Through
foreign policy decisions, determination can be made as to who will live and who will die
as well as which countries and economies will flourish and which will languish.
Does ethics play a part in foreign policy decisions, or is it merely expedient with
only the short-term objectives in mind? Are foreign policy decisions made openly so that
citizens of the country know what is being done in their name and with their tax money, or
are they clandestine so that the ramifications as well as costs are hidden unless
scandalously exposed? In a representative democracy, is there a moral need for openness,
honesty, and accountability in foreign policy decisions?
For the United States, the Middle East has become an especially important and
volatile region. In chapter one, a recent history of the Middle East will be discussed.
Since Iraq has become particularly prominent, the diplomatic and trade practices of a
variety of countries, including the United States, will be discussed. Iraq's human rights
record will also be discussed.
Chapter two will explain Rosemary Tong's discourse on the use of 'many hands’
and 'dirty hands' in policy making. Models for the assumption of responsibility and
excuses to avoid accepting responsibility will be examined.
The Iran-Contra affair will be discussed in chapter three as a case study in which
the 'many hands' and 'dirty hands' concepts can be applied. Possible candidates for
responsibility will be named and the excuses available to avoid responsibility will be
l

discussed.
After eight years of battle with Iran, Iraq was able with three years o f preparation
to launch war once again with the invasion of Kuwait. In chapter four, the United States
interaction with Iraq which helped Iraq rearm will be explored.
Chapter five will draw together a synthesis of the information presented and will
explain policy suggestions that could enable ethics to be introduced in foreign policy
making.

CHAPTER 1

R E C E N T H IST O R Y O F T H E M ID D LE EAST

Prior to the Persian Gulf W ar o f 1991, what guided foreign policy in the
Middle East, especially United States foreign policy? Since the end of World War
II, the United States has seen itself in a bipolar military competition with the Soviet
Union. Their major theaters of action contained Europe and Northeast Asia.
Beginning with the Carter administration and continuing through the Reagan and
Bush administrations, a third theater emerged - the Persian Gulf. A knowledge of
the recent past expands an attempt to understand foreign policy regarding the
Middle East.
As the 1970s began, the importance of the Persian Gulf area became
apparent to U.S. policy makers with the withdrawal o f the British from East o f the
Suez, the United States’ expanding reliance on Gulf oil, and a gradual increase in
Soviet involvement. Three important events fueled U.S. military planning. During
the 1973 Middle East war, Arab oil producers imposed an oil embargo against the
United States and the Netherlands. Concerned that this strategy would use oil as a
weapon, some individuals in policy discussions proposed the use of U.S. military
force to secure oil fields should this condition of oil-as-a-weapon arise. Second,
following the disposition of the Shah of Iran, chaos within the country caused oil
production to fall which made oil prices rise significantly. Iran and Saudi Arabia
had been the pillars of stability in the region, and one pillar, Iran, had toppled.
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Finally, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, President
Carter included in his 1980 State of the Union address what later was called the
"Carter Doctrine":
Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian
G ulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of
the United States of America and such assault will be repelled by
any means necessary including militaiy force. (Johnson, 1989,
123-124)
By March 1980, a "Rapid Deployment Task Force" (RDJTF or RDF) was created
and an effort was made to secure bases in the Middle East. President Reagan
transformed the RDF "into a new military command, the U.S. Central Command
or CENTCOM." (Johnson, 1989, 124)
Because Iran was destablized after the fall of the shah, the United States
was afraid that the Soviet Union might exploit the political disorder and invade.
The U.S. military services and the State Department wanted to avoid messy local
conflicts and saw the real problems as broader difficulties in the region and
increased strain in U.S.-Soviet relations. Anti-Soviet feelings fueled by fear
opened the door for planning to use force if all else failed and made a public case
for embracing RDF. Johnson says, "Not for the first time, a conception of the
Soviet threat that was designed to sell a policy or program came to be accepted as
genuine." (Johnson, 1989, 127)
Robert E. H u n t e r i n an article titled, "The Reagan Administration and the
Middle East" asserts, "Under Secretaiy of State Alexander Haig, the
administration tried to put the Middle East in a broader context, a 'strategic
consensus' of regional states in alliance against a Soviet advance." (Hunter, 1987,
49) By 1981, the Carter Doctrine, by then the Reagan Doctrine, focused on the
Soviet Union as Haig attempted to enlist regional powers against the U.S.S.R.
Both Egypt and Israel accepted the concept of strategic consensus. Egypt had

assisted the U.S. effort to rescue hostages in Teheran, was prepared to provide
base access to U.S. forces, and had joined military exercises. Israel granted U.S.
forces participation in its defense by allowing elements o f the United States 101st
Airborne Division to serve in the multinational force in the Sinai Desert. (Hunter,
1987, 49-50)
Neither Jordan nor Saudi Arabia became involved in supporting the U.S.
with regards to strategic consensus because they saw it as dependent on changes in
Israel's position in Jerusalem and the West Bank; they saw the Soviet Union's
power as removed from them and the United States preoccupations as not applying
to them. At this point the United States' effort to make the Middle East into a
global strategic environment did not reach fruition. (Hunter, 1987, 50)
Concurrently, an Arab-Israeli peace process did not deeply interest the
Reagan administration. Because of the 1979 Egypt-Israeli peace treaty, the Reagan
administration seemed rarely to engage in the United States’ traditional role as
peacemaker. Hunter suggests that opportunities for peace within the Middle East
"rarely seemed promising to policy makers in Washington, ...(since) peacemaking
(was) time-consuming, and the peace process (had) often proved to be the
graveyard o f political ambitions." (Hunter, 1987, 49) These factors contributed to
the administration's reduced contributions to try to negotiate peace.
Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, it became clear that the
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty had kept the conflict confined to the region and that
for the first time "since Israel's successful struggle for independence and statehood
in 1947-49 ...there was no hint of United States-Soviet confrontation." (Hunter
1987, 50) At this point, the United States decided to become militarily involved in
Lebanon. The first mission, to remove Palestine Liberation Organization fighters
from Beirut, went well. The second which followed the massacres in the Sabra
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and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps by Christian Phalangist forces did not fair as
well. (Hunter, 1987, 50)
The United States attempted to help bring about the withdrawal o f Israeli
and Syrian troops from Lebanon and to help Lebanon recover. Both Syria and
Israel had their own agendas in Lebanon and neither had complete withdrawal in
mind. Syria had reasons o f political influence to remain in Lebanon, and for Israel
the reason was security. "...(H)elping to resolve what was, indeed, a civil war in
Lebanon would have required a degree of knowledge, subtlety, diplomatic skill
and political commitment lacking in the Reagan administration." (Hunter 1987, 50)
These deficiencies on the part of the administration allowed both the Israelis and
the Syrians to remain in Lebanon, while the Syrians heavily rearmed. The
administration did not understand the agenda of Lebanon's Maronite Christian
President, Amin Germayel, which was the Maronite dream to keep primacy
throughout Lebanon. (Hunter, 1987,50)
What did occur was that the United States forces which were part of a
multinational peacekeeping force became the target for many political activists and
finally resulted in the October, 1983, terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks
which killed 241 Marines. The administration's response to this was to declare
Lebanon o f vital interest and the key to the future of the Middle East. By
February, 1984, this no longer rang true for the administration and the United
States forces withdrew. What followed was that Syria gained primacy in Lebanon
which became the locus for further terrorism against people from the United
States. (Hunter, 1987, 50-51)
During this same time, the Iran-Iraq War continued. Both the Soviet
Union and the United States publicly practiced policies of neutrality in the war.
By 1981, the United States had begun rapprochement with Iraq for the first time

since the Ba'ath Party gained control in 1968. In 1982, Iraq was removed from
the official list of countries supporting terrorism. This action was implemented by
the Commerce Department. On March 18,1982, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee met with Vincent DeCain, Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Export Administration; Ernest Johnston, Jr., Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State; Joe Twinam, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs; William A. Root,
Office for Combating Terrorism; Frank Perez, Acting Director, Office for
Combating Terrorism; and David B. Dlouhy, Country Officer for South Africa to
discuss this new export status for Iraq and other countries. (U.S. Congress,
Senate 1982, III)
According to the Fenwick amendment of 1979,
Congress is to be notified 30 days in advance before export
licenses can be issued for goods or services valued at more than $7
million (and) which would enhance the military potential or
terrorism-support capabilities of countries which have repeatedly
supported acts of international terrorism." (U.S. Congress, Senate
1982,1)
Additionally, a yearly review determines if a country may be removed from the list
of countries supporting terrorism or not. During the hearing, Senator Boschwitz
from Minnesota pointed out to Mr. DeCain that a study had just been completed by
the Library o f Congress Congressional Research Service which showed that Iraq
had taken responsibility for at least a dozen terrorist attacks in 1980 and 1981. He
continued by saying that despite Congressional scrutiny, sales to Iraq had
increased from $443 million in 1979, to $913 million in 1981. The details of what
these sales included were not discussed with the exception of five large airliners.
Concern that commercial airliners could be converted to military purposes was
discussed. Senator Boschwitz expressed concern that the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee had not been consulted, but that rather the Banking
Committee had been privy to this change in Iraq's status. (U.S. Congress, Senate
1982, 3-5)
Mr. Johnston from the State Department explained during his statement
that
...the Secretary o f State decided to no longer include Iraq among
those countries considered to be repeated supporters of
international terrorism,... (the State Department) took particular
notice of the fact that in 1981, Iraq continued the pattern in recent
years of reducing (emphasis mine) assistance to individuals and
groups which employ terrorist means. (U.S. Congress, Senate
1982, 9)
Later in the meeting, Mr. Johnston said that there had been consultation with the
Department of Commerce when determining that Iraq was no longer designated a
supporter of international terrorism. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982, 33)
Mr. Johnston reaffirmed that this action would not affect military aid to
Iraq because the U.S. was maintaining "a policy of strict neutrality in the Iran-Iraq
War." (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982, 10) In his prepared statement, Mr. Johnston
continued,
It is our policy not to establish a military supply relationship with Iraq or with
Iran. All items which would significantly enhance the military capability of either
side are denied. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982, 13)
The testimony continued with a case being made that Iraq was moving closer to
more moderate government in the Gulf area and that this was a move that the
United States wanted to reinforce. As the discussion continued, a question arose
about the foreign policy purpose of the sales to Iraq. What became clear was that
part of the purpose was to get the market, since other countries or suppliers would
be available to fill the gap if the U.S. did not. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982, 17)
Also in Mr. Johnston's prepared statement he says that in the area of

human rights the rationale is "to distance the United States from governments with
poor human rights records and to encourage improvements in the respect of human
rights." (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982, 12) Although not discussed during this
hearing, the Amnesty International report issued in 1981 told of fifteen Iraqi exiles
who had been severely tortured, the severity o f which had been corroborated by
physicians in London was public knowledge (Miller, 1990,245) as was the long
record of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party of disregard for human life,
including an extensive history o f detention, torture, and executions. 'Official'
executions were documented by Amnesty International when it reported over 350
in 1981 alone. This was augmented by the biographical particulars on 798
executions, 264 killings o f unknown persons, and 428 cases o f unsentenced
detainees and disappeared persons reported by the Committee Against Repression.
Rather than denying responsibility for the deaths, the Ba'ath party reportedly
returned a sealed box containing the 'remains' of the corpse but did not allow the
recipient to see them. The dead person died, they said, from something such as
fire, drowning, or some other accident. (Al-Khalil, 1989, 64)
Mr. Johnston's reply to questioning about Iraq's continuing qualifications
to remain off of the terrorist list reassured the committee: "Should Iraq's behavior
warrant we will not hesitate to return Iraq to the list." (U. S. Congress, Senate
1982,34) This example of promised retroactive law enforcement reminds me of
how, after the United States has provided a government with materials, training,
and technology, these same things can be used against the U.S. as shown by the
Khomeini regime after the fall of the shah. As Senator Boschwitz questioned Mr.
Johnston, the question of airplanes sold to terrorist countries arose. A case of
selling planes to Libya was considered. Libya assured the United States that the
planes would not be used for purposes of which the United States would

disapprove, but, in fact, they were used to transport soldiers to Uganda to fight
with the army of Idi Amin. After the U.S. became aware of this, an embargo of
spare parts was established. At the time o f this meeting, 1982, the same kind of
guarantee of cooperation was contracted with Iraq so that if something sold was
misused something else, such as an embargo of spare parts, could be implemented
to correct the situation. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982, 18-19)
Although in 1982, most of the funds that Iraq had received from Arab
supporters stopped, Iraq was able to reestablish Arab ties beginning with an
agreement with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to export an estimated 300 thousand
barrels per day (b/d) of oil under a time exchange agreement which would add an
annual $3 billion in revenues for Iraq. (Axelgard, 1986, 9) Additionally, a 500
b/d pipeline from Iraq's southern oil fields to the trans-Saudi Arabia Petroline was
contracted to begin in September 1984, with completion in 1985. (Axelgard,
1986, 10)
In early 1983, a $120 million Euroloan was secured to expand the transTurkey pipeline to increase the flow of oil to one million b/d. This increase in oil
dependence contributed to a more solid tie between Iraq and Turkey. In 1983-84,
Turkish troops help repel Kurdish insurgents who attempted to sabotage this
pipeline. (Axelgard, 1986,10) Alternative routes were sought "across Saudi
Arabia to the Red Sea port o f Yanbu and across Jordan to its main port of Aqaba."
Both lines had U.S. firms involved. Brown & Root engineered the Saudi route
and Bechtel planned the Jordan line. Italian and French contractors completed the
first line that links Iraq's southern oil fields with Saudi's east-west Petroline.
(Axelgard, 1986, 41)
By the beginning of 1983, Iraq had received $35 billion in loans from
friendly Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates

and Qatar. Other such loans soon became available from other more international
sources. (Axelgard, 1986, 36) The United Kingdom
offered a total of $362 million made up of a general-purpose line of
credit for nominated capital goods and equipment,...used for
power stations, housing, hospital, water supply, and oil projects,
and a loan for pharmaceutical projects. (Axelgard, 1986, 36)
In 1985, the British offered another loan along the same structure but with a larger
portion to go for pharmaceutical projects. While Tokyo did not want to finance
large projects, credit was extended for the purchase of medical equipment for
thirteen Japanese-built hospitals. (Axelgard, 1986, 36-37)
In 1985, Austrian companies were awarded contracts in Iraq with lines of
credit reaching $268 million. Italy made $500 million available to Iraq, Greece put
up $100 million, and Ireland operated a $24 million roll-over credit deal. East
Germany offered $200 million to support project work, the Soviet Union put up
$2 billion in long-term credit, and Yugoslavia offered $500 million for which it
would accept oil as repayment as would "some other East European countries,
France, Japan, and some individual companies." (Axelgard, 1986, 37) Brazilian,
Indian, and South Korean companies worked on a rail line to link Baghdad with
the Syrian border, with Basra and the Kuwaiti border, and with the Turkish
border. (Axelgard, 1986, 44)
The international community was involved in agricultural development in
Iraq. The Yugoslavians set up the Dujayl agro-industrial project. South Koreans
and Chinese contractors established the first stage of the A1 Jazirah scheme to
reclaim 100 hectares. The Chinese picked up "contracts to build river barges to
store water for irrigation." (Axelgard, 1986,45)
Following 1984, many U. S. firms did business in Iraq. These firms
included: DeLeuw Cather International, Borg-Wamer Corporation’s York

12
International, Carrier International, NCR International, Mega Tech, and The
Architects Collaborative (TAC), Howe-Baker Engineering, General Electric,
Raymond International, Brown & Root, Ventauri Rauch, and Scott Brown. This
interest by U.S. firms increased because of improved diplomatic relations between
Washington and Baghdad in 1984. The Commerce Department advised U. S.
firms by way o f guidance
that their best prospects (were) the supply o f agricultural
commodities, equipment and services, computers and software,
irrigation equipment and services, water treatment equipment and
services, and petroleum development and exploration equipment
and services. (Axelgard, 1986, 53)
Baghdad had also become "interested in U.S. training programs and technology at
all levels, as well as expertise in planning and operating transport activities in
ports, airports, roads, and railways." (Axelgard, 1986, 53)
By sharp contrast, and also in 1984, after meeting with senior Iraqi
officials, "Peter Galbraith, Claiborne Pell's Foreign Relations Committee aide,
submitted a staff report warning that Hussein was running a neo-Stalinist state."
(Waller, 1986,13) At the request o f the Committee's majority Republican staff,
the impact of the report was lessened because the administration was planning to
normalize diplomatic relations with Iraq and did not want to be embarrassed in the
process. (Waller, 1986, 13-14)
Another example of U.S. strategy and policy in the Middle East with
regards to acts of terrorism is the case of Libya and Muammar Qaddafi. After the
1985, hijacking of TWA fight 847 to Beirut and murder of a U.S. Navy frogman,
President Reagan was faced with a difficult problem. He could take a position that
said that the U.S. wanted the hostages freed with no deals, or he could end the
situation by giving the hijackers what they wanted - Shiite prisoners held in Israel.
The President ended the crisis by securing the freedom of the Shiites while

publicly stating he had held to his hard-line position of no compromise. (Hunter,
1987, 52)
This incident was followed by the hijacking o f the Achille Lauro and the
murder o f Leon Klinghoffer. By this time, the United States media were
fascinated with these events as were the people of the U.S. Many U.S. citizens
refused to travel because they were so afraid of hijackings although the number of
U.S. people killed by terrorists was only 39 in 1985, which, as Hunter points out,
is slim compared to the number o f people killed each year in the United States.
But this left Mr. Reagan with quite a risky situation. He and his administration did
not want to look impotent as the Carter administration had looked during the
hostage crisis in Teheran.
...(N)iether the President nor his senior officials were prepared to
put terrorism in perspective—an evil, but not crippling in terms of
num bers-nor were they able to begin to do something about its
causes. This would mean becoming reengaged, if only
economically, with the morass called Lebanon, and taking a lead in
Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Neither road promised the quick results
apparently demanded by the American public. (Hunter, 1987,52)
What could the President do to show the citizens of the United States that
his administration was potent and able to fight back against terrorism? Military
action against terrorist groups proved close to impossible because there was no
one clear target. However, Muammar Qaddafi had shown himself to support and
instigate terrorism, and the U.S. public was aware of this. "This was the main
reason that the Reagan administration singled out Libya and Colonel Muammar
Qaddafi for isolation and punishment." (Hunter, 1987,52) Libya also was not
closely tied to the Soviet Union, it was accessible to military action, and it was
"barely able to shoot back." (Hunter, 1987, 52) "The United States attack on
Libya in April, 1986, was thus less about trying to end terrorism than about
assuring the American people that something was being done." (Hunter, 1987,52)
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One unfortunate side-effect of the U.S. military attack on Libya however
was the alienation the U.S. experienced from virtually all European countries.
This is worth recalling when considering the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Hunter
states that "allied cooperation ... increased after the Libyan raid." (Hunter, 1987,
52) However, two camps appeared. On the one hand, European governments
continued to criticize the United States government for running risks through
military action that quite likely would not reduce terrorism, for choosing a lesser
agent to attack, and "for failing either to put the terror problem in perspective or to
deal with at least some of the causes of terrorism -m ost important, the Arab-Israeli
conflict." (Hunter, 1987,52) On the other hand, the government of the United
States attacked the allies for not being stronger in their stand against terrorism. The
British were spared because that government allowed the U.S. to use UK military
bases during the attack on Libya. (Hunter, 1987, 52)
One consequence of United States policy strategy in the Middle East was
the reflagging of the Kuwaiti oil tankers. Hunter refers to the relationship between
Kuwait and Iraq as ambiguous at best and co-belligerent at worst. To protect its
oil tankers, Kuwait, which was shipping and selling oil for Iraq, turned to the
superpowers for help. The United States did not want the Soviet Union to reflag
any of the ships and, therefore, agreed to reflag all eleven of them. The
Congressional committees that were informed of the reflagging did not respond.
The reflagging of the tankers was seen as a tilt toward Iraq since it was the
Iranians who were attacking the Iraqi tankers. In what appeared to be an accident,
the Iraqis attacked a U.S. frigate, killing 37 U.S. sailors; this was seen as a
continuation of the tanker war. The Reagan administration reaffirmed its pledge to
reflag Kuwaiti tankers and increased the naval deployments in the G ulf and the
surrounding area—"where for 30 years United States Navy vessels have been

deployed—to about 35 ships and 25,000 men." (Hunter, 1988, 50)
Hunter suggests this increased involvement was not for the protection of
oil. Rather the United States had three motives: the Soviet Union would not gain
any benefits from reflagging Kuwaiti tankers; the morale of the Iraqis would be
raised in the face o f more intensified Iranian force; and the Arab states o f the
Persian G ulf would see the U.S. arms sales to Iran as a deviation instead of the
standard. Reflagging the tankers was a political decision not a military one.
(Hunter, 1988, 51) Iraq was hoping the U.S. presence would help convince Iran
to go to the bargaining table, but with the flow o f oil unimpeded, Iran actually
benefited.
After the Iranians had accused the United States of being responsible for
the deaths o f Iranian Shia pilgrims at the hands o f Saudi security forces at Mecca,
the Iraqis resumed the tanker war to which the Iranians retaliated by firing Chinese
Silkworm missiles which then hit a Kuwaiti oil platform. By the close o f 1987, it
was not clear if the United States wanted to engage in a major conflict with Iran or,
if it did, if it would continue until the fall of Khomenini's regime. The Iranians
did not want this type of engagement mainly because of the toll that would be
exacted by the superior firepower of the United States. (Hunter, 1988, 51)
What did emerge during 1984, was that Iran and the United States "shared
two important strategic interests: ensuring that the flow of oil would not be halted
and, more important, containing the influence of the Soviet Union." (Hunter,
1988, 51) What was also clear was that the United States did not want the spread
of the Iranian revolution. Again the United States government found itself in a
difficult position. On the one hand, it did not want an escalated military
involvement with Iran, but on the other hand, it did not want to seem as though its
presence in the Persian Gulf was being chased out. Additionally, members of

Congress had begun to question the reflagging of the Kuwaiti tankers and the
naval deployments. While members of Congress called for invoking the War
Powers Resolution of 1973, the administration did not want to do this for fear that
it would be more difficult to stop an action than to start one. (Hunter, 1988, 51)
...(T)he United States was not in control of the situation in the
Persian Gulf. By its own hand, it had become effectively held
hostage to actions taken by Iraq's President Saddam Hussein (the
tanker war) and by Ayatollah Khomeini. (Hunter, 1988, 51)
The United States needed a show of support from other Western oil
consuming, maritime nations, and thus sought help from its West European allies
in the form of mine sweepers. Those countries responding were Britain, France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, all of which sent ships to the Persian Gulf.
West Germany prepared to do so but did not. This response on the part of the
allies was to help insure continued
influence in Washington on the course of the United States policy
in the gulf region, (a)nd (because) they did not want the American
people and their government to react against West European
abstention in a crisis that affected the United States but also
involved the interests of other Western states. They recalled the
recriminations when no West European country except Britain
provided support for the United States air raid on Libya in April,
1986. They feared American irritation as the United States began
reconsidering the issues of burden-sharing within the Western
alliance and the continued presence of 326,000 United States
soldiers on the continent. (Hunter, 1988, 52)
The United States government wanted neither Iran nor Iraq to predominate
in the war. It wanted the oil to continue to flow and good relations with local Arab
states to be maintained. The United States also took the lead to force Iran to the
bargaining table through means established by the United Nations. The UN
Security Council Resolution 598 exceeded the needs of the U.S. It requested Iran
and Iraq to recognize a cease-fire and to begin negotiations. This request was
directed to Iran since Iraq wanted to negotiate. Iran's key demand was that Iraq be

acknowledged as the aggressor in the war. As bargaining continued, the Soviet
Union and China, members of the UN Security Council, blocked hopes for
imposing sanctions for an arms embargo. Each had its own agenda: China feared
gains by the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union could benefit from the United
States continued conflict with Iran. (Hunter, 1988, 52)
In 1987, the Soviet Union was more active than usual in the G ulf area. It
became an important element in the Persian Gulf and in the United States policy
for the area. However, despite the Soviet Union's activity in the Persian G ulf
area, the opportunities for expansion were limited first by geography and then by
the proclivity of the local Arab states to make a pro-U.S. reaction to a Soviet
buildup. The Soviets offered a joint East-West security arrangement for the area
which the U.S. did not want because the United States government was concerned
that its credibility would further erode. However, unless Iran engaged in a civil
war and the Khomeini regime collapsed,
fear o f a Soviet invasion had diminished radically since 1980. But
the risk of major Soviet influence remained, and in 1987, Soviet
diplomats were assiduous in keeping open the political lines to
Teheran. (Hunter, 1988, 52)
Hunter continued, "(b)ecause the United States was not in control of the pace of
activity in the gulf, the risk of Soviet opportunity to realize a centuries-old dream
o f decisive influence" (Hunter, 1988, 52) lingered.
Moderate Arab friends of the United States continued to exert a degree of
pressure on the U.S. stemming from the revelation of the arms sales to Iran and
the United States government's lack o f effort in the Arab-Israeli peace process.
For reasons already stated, the U.S. continued not to want to become involved in
that process. This omission contributed to the inability of moderate Arab states to
regain confidence in the United States. The U.S. was not alone in the G ulf area,

and though the Soviet Union was not viewed as a government to be trusted nor did
it possess desirable economic or ideological goods, U.S. "diplomacy was being
compared to that o f the Soviet Union." (Hunter, 1988,90) Again the U.S.
steadfastness and staying power were being questioned. Hunter ends his article,
"United States Policy in the Middle East" by saying,
Unless the United States manages to shore up its fading reputation
for leadership, wisdom and creativity, the questions posed about
United States policy toward the Middle East in 1987 will mark that
year as the nadir of the United States position in the region.
(Hunter, 1988, 90)
In 1988, the Iran-Iraq war ended. Because the number of available martyrs
had declined and the economy was in a state of collapse, those advisors close to
Khomeini persuaded him to consider the UN cease-fire. While realizing he had to
accept the cease-fire, "(h)e told his people that taking the decision 'was more
deadly than taking poison.'" (Mansfield, 1991, 333) Even though the Islamic
Republic had not been overthrown, Iraq had won the war "by not losing, just as
Khomeini had lost by not winning." (Mansfield, 1991, 333)
How is it that policy decisions can be made which favor and even enhance
governments whose practices seem contraindicated to those values, such as natural
rights, life, and liberty to name a few, which are the very cornerstones of the
United States republic? In chapter two, Rosemarie Tong explores some
possibilities when she discusses a reality of bureaucracy described as "dirty hands,
many hands, and no hands."
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CHAPTER 2

R O S E M A R IE T O N G 'S
E T H IC S O F P O L IC Y D E C ISIO N S
AND M O D EL S O F R E S P O N S IB IL IT Y

Is foreign policy a well-orchestrated, well-thought out, morally-based doctrine or
an expedient, secrecy-laden clandestine operation, or both? When the time comes for a
policy maker or politician to take responsibility for a popular or unpopular policy decision,
how is that responsibility assumed? Rosemarie Tong's "Dirty Hands, Many Hands, No
Hands: The Policy Expert Within the Bowels of the Bureaucracy" explores these
questions. *
The intricacies o f United States foreign policy are extensive. Who are the U.S.
allies? It depends on what year is discussed or what objective is to be met. How does
one international and even one national event affect another? By looking at Tong's work,
I have become aware that many possibilities exist not only for how and why a policy
decision is made but also about how a policy maker or politician assumes or avoids
responsibility.

D IR T Y HANDS
How is that a policy maker can make decisions that as personal decisions she
would consider immoral? When someone makes this type of decision, Tong and others
describe this as a case of 'dirty hands'.
An example of 'dirty hands' decision making is explained by looking at
20
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Machiavelli's prince. For the prince, a need to redefine 'vice' and 'virtue' exists. "A vice
is that which, if followed, would lead to the state's ruin; a virtue is that which, if
followed, would lead to the state's greater security and well-being." (62) Whether on a
personal level an act would be seen as a virtuous act or not is irrelevant. The greater good
of the security of the state is more important than any moral guideline. On a personal level
an act may be seen as one creating 'dirty hands' but on a state level the act would be seen
as virtuous and necessary.
Following the line of'dirty hands,' Michael Walzer suggests that when a politician
acts for "the greatest ratio of good to evil ( the Principle of Utility) for everyone," she may
feel guilty because she may have had to violate her duty "as specified by the Ten
Commandments." (64) For instance, she might violate Thou shalt not steal' while
supporting the acquisition of land seen as needed for mineral rights. She might see this as
a violation against stealing because through native tradition as well as former treaty the
land belongs to Native Americans. Should the politician be unable to support the
acquisition of this tract of land thus avoiding her conscientious guilt for violating the
invocation not to steal, she would also not maximize the greater good of her industrialized
constituents by acquiring the mineral rights existing under the land. One problem faced by
politicians is that some of the same people who would castigate them for not performing
the utility-maximizing action will also condemn them for not adhering to the Ten
Commandments or other generally accepted rules of moral conduct.
One choice a politician has is to proclaim '"Utilitarianism is the moral point of
view. Not only politicians but everyone at all times and in all places should abide by the
Principle of Utility'" (64); thus the action for the greater good would always be followed.
For Walzer this is not true. He believes that if a politician cannot be morally justified for
her actions, people ought to be able to excuse the actions or forgive them for 'them' could
just as easily be 'us'. We, as a society, not only want decisions made based on what will
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be done for our greater good, but we also want to be able to bring the politician back into
the community just as we would want to be brought back into the community after
committing a transgression. However, these same excuses and forgiveness do not come
freely or without recourse. Excuses and forgiveness should be allowed only to the
politicians who "not only feel regret for their wrong actions but also are willing to accept
responsibility—and even punishment—for them." (64)
An example of committing an act which produces 'dirty hands' while still
assuming responsibility for the action is Camus' assassins ^ w^° are w^ inS t0 accept the
consequences, even unto death, for their actions. Camus' assassins are the example for
those politicians who violate the Ten Commandments and other moral codes to maximize
the greatest good to evil and are willing to accept what happens to them because of their
actions. According to Walzer, Camus' assassins are justified and their actions are
rendered right actions because they do maximize the greatest good to evil and accept
responsibility for their actions.
In the case of assassination, a law has been broken and therefore, a course of
punishment exists. However, no such punishment exists for the politician who breaks
moral rules for political reasons. If, in fact, such a recourse were available for the
punishment of moral violations committed to maximize the greater good to evil, we, as a
society, would honor the person who did a wrong or immoral deed and still punish him.
If all that Oliver North had done was lie to Congress and no law existed to prohibit this
action, then he could be honored by many citizens of the United States as he is, and,
rather than having his charges dropped, he would have been punished for lying and
obstructing the search for truth by lying to Congress.
As far as moral transgressions go, while a politician may not be incarcerated, we
citizens may take solace because she still will not be free of a sinner's fate of conscience.
Somehow the knowledge that a politician suffers pangs of conscience
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reassures us. Indeed, even the bare belief that a politician is the type of
person who would do private penance for politically expedient but morally
unjustifiable actions enables us to excuse and to forgive him or her—if not
to justify and to forget his or her actions. (65)
For Machiavelli's prince, dirty hands are inevitable and excusable because the
terms that create the idea of dirty hands, vice and virtue, can be redefined so that if one is
working for the security and well-being of the state, one is acting in a virtuous manner,
even if by another definition o f virtue the situation could be defined as vice. In other
words, dirty hands are relative. Michael Walzer is able to justify actions which may not
adhere to the Ten Commandments or other moral codes by having the agent willingly
accept punishment, as in the case o f Camus' assassins. Additionally, the notion that
politicians may make morally questionable decisions that may maximize the greater good
to evil but then also feel pangs of guilt and do private purgation can help citizens forgive
violations done in their names.
While policy makers and politicians may employ 'dirty hands' to achieve
objectives they deem for the greater good, a more difficult route to track for culpability is
the problem of the 'many hands' which forms the network of many policy decisions
today.

M AN Y HANDS
In the province of policy making, many individuals speaking different languages
and discussing a multitude of issues are the players.
The persons who initially formulate a problem are generally not the ones
who ultimately resolve it; and quite often no one really knows how many
people did or did not contribute to its solution. (67)
So in addition to having simply 'dirty hands' where one individual formulates policy
decisions, one is also faced with a problem of the 'many hands' involved in policy
making. Numerous agents render arduous the identification of whom to hold morally, and
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in some cases even legally, responsible for political decisions.
Given that the nation-state consists o f citizens, who work together to form society
and to form the government o f the nation-state, the loss to society for not knowing who
will accept responsibility for political decisions is the loss of the nation's ethical
sensitivities. (68)
Because so many individuals are involved in the process o f political decision
making, no one person may be accountable for decisions. Thus when some event, such
as the Iran-Contra affair or policy decisions regarding trade practices in the Middle East
occurs, it is not so much a matter that one person, enticed to commit transgressions,
provided the direction for the action, as it is a tale "of foiled and/or flaunted lines of
responsibility." (68)
Tong proposes
What is frightening about contemporary policy making is the feeling that
the decisions most likely to affect society for better or worse are made not
by identifiable persons but by an amorphous collectively whose willy-nilly
processes cannot be stopped once they are started. (68)
Dennis F. Thompson states that although it may be difficult to figure out who is
morally responsible among those who make public policy, it is not impossible. Through
the application of an idea of "personal responsibility grounded on a combination of causal
criteria, the concept of intention, and the idea of role," (68) Thompson believes the agent
can be discovered. Thus, through implementing various models of responsibility,
indications o f those accountable can become apparent. These models include the
Hierarchical Model of Responsibility, the Collective Model o f Responsibility, and the
Personal Model of Responsibility.
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TH E H IE R A R C H IC A L M O D EL
O F R E S P O N S IB IL IT Y
In a hierarchical model, each individual is responsible for one set of functions, and
the individual does not go outside the boundaries of this set. Higher up the hierarchical
ladder, supervisors direct operations; below, individuals have fewer decisions to make.
The people on the top, the elected policy makers, make decisions; the
people on the bottom, among whom are situated most policy experts,
simply rubber-stamp and/or carry them out. (68)
Ultimate responsibility would then go to the person highest on the totem pole. What this
allows for is that the leader takes the blame or praise and the underlings are able to be
absolved o f culpability or reward because they "'were either following the orders of (their)
superiors or adhering to the procedures o f (their) organization.'" (68)
Tong believes this hierarchical model is deficient in several ways. First, because,
in bureaucracies, there are so many people involved and time constraints may prevail,
authority will necessarily be delegated. This authority may not go to the person best
qualified to work through a task but rather to the individual who will put in the most time.
Second, taking blame or praise may be unfair both to the superior and to an underling.
The superior may not be aware of what the underling has done. In like kind, it is unfair to
the underling because it strips her of both disapprobation and approbation, depending on
the opinion o f the work. This does not allow for the development of either individual as a
moral agent. (69) If one does not take feedback, both positive and negative, one's moral
development is retarded because it is through careful consideration of the responses one
receives concerning one's activities as well as the outcome of one's decisions that one is
able to mature in many aspects of one's life, including moral maturity.
While with the hierarchical model, the person highest up on the ladder of
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command is held responsible, accountability is not insured. The superior may simply
delegate tasks leading to decisions. I believe, however, that if the hierarchical model were
accepted, then just as in the Nuremberg Principles those giving the orders would have to
be held responsible. This would not excuse the actions o f the underling (as was seen in
the Nuremberg Principles), but it, too, would not allow the superior to feign innocence
and thus be freed from responsibility for decisions made during his command (as we saw
during the Iran-Contra affair when President Reagan continually stated he knew nothing
o f the plan).
Since bureaucracy and policy making consist of groups of people working toward
various objectives, the collective model of responsibility may offer a more adequate
illustration.

T H E C O L L E C T IV E M O D EL
O F R E S P O N S IB IL IT Y
When examining groups working on projects, to keep from employing the
hierarchical model of responsibility which allows both superiors and subordinates to avoid
responsibility and to be denied praise, some theorists use a collective model for assigning
responsibility, although not for an individual.
One version of the collective model holds that no individual is morally
responsible for any of the collectivity's decisions and actions; rather, the
collectivity as a whole is responsible. (69)
At some point a decision is made, but there is no one to be held responsible. Thompson
says he believes that this is more a form of non responsibility that
overlooks what is obvious; namely, that people act in the context of
ongoing institutions, and that they may be culpable for creating the
structural faults of the institution, or for making inadequate efforts to
correct them. (69)
Bureaucrats do not have to be passive in the environment in which they work for
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they can contribute to the development of that same environment. A collective
responsibility can be created in which each individual is accountable. When a condition
"of homogeneity, stability, and collectivism" is established among agents, "the notion of
collective responsibility ..., (which means) that state of affairs in which each individual is
accountable for every decision and action of the collectivity, is likely to take root and
flourish." (70) Thus the deeds of the group become the deeds o f the individual who, in
theory, cannot hide behind the group mask for accepting praise or blame because it is the
individual who has constituted what the actions of the group will be.
While this collective responsibility helps make each individual aware that she
shares the responsibility, the downside of this is that things may be left undone because
everyone thinks someone else will do them. It may also lead "people to adopt the
psychology of the contented committee member who is able to solve any pricks o f
conscience with the balm of 'It must be okay because the group says it is okay."' (70)
An individual may lose sight of how much or how little input she had in the collective
decision making instead of accepting that her involvement in the group's decisions carries
weight, responsibility, as any other member.
Since individuals in the collective model can still escape accountability, the
personal model of responsibility should place responsibility at each individual's doorstep,
or, as President Truman said, "The buck stops here."

T H E PER SO N A L M O D EL
O F R E S P O N S IB IL IT Y
Allowing that in the hierarchical model, the superior may delegate deeds and thus
believe she is not responsible for the outcomes of these deeds, and the underling may
believe she is free of responsibility because the superior must assume it, and that in the
collective model a spirit o f 'all for one and one for all' might prevail without anyone rising
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to accept accountability and that the group as the responsible agent lessens the degree to
which blame or praise may be offered or accepted by any one individual, the personal
model o f responsibility can, perhaps, assign accountability to none other than the
individual. Although the individual is responsible according to the personal model,
excuses for behavior can be made. These excuses include [a] causal (something that
happens in such a way as to go toward a result other than assuming responsibility) and [b]
volitional (a choice or decision made willingly but which depends on what exactly is
known by the agent).
One main causal excuse is the excuse from alternative cause. The excuse from the
alternative cause states that had one individual not done something then another would
have. Tong says in its strong form this excuse has little force because one can never be
certain that someone else will replace another. In its weak form, however, it has some
validity. Tong uses the example of George, a scientist, who cannot get any job except as
a biochemist working on germ warfare. George knows he is not brilliant and will not
enable any great breakthroughs in deadly viruses so he takes the job thus saving the world
from the possible research of a more capable scientist. One problem with this seen by
Bernard Williams is that the individual, in this case George, will destroy his image to
himself as a humanitarian, which is why in the first place he decided to take the job, and
thus he will pursue research or contribute input in his field of study with little or no regard
for the outcome o f his research. Tong counters this with
(d)espite the force of Williams's objection to the excuse from alternative
cause, integrity may not be too high a price to pay at all times and in all
places. Ideological purity can degenerate into smug self-righteousness.
(72)
For Tong, times exist when compromising one's integrity and putting oneself in a
situation such as George in his job as the biochemist performing mediocre research is
preferable to allowing a competent scientist to take the job. George's taking the job is to
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society's benefit regardless of the personal cost to George.
One problem I see with Tong's rationale of relinquishing integrity and Williams
notion of the individual becoming apathetic about the consequences of her actions is that
no means exists for the person who witnesses morally questionable activities to bring
these activities to the attention of superiors or even to outside agents who may be affected
by the results o f these activities. Perhaps George would not degenerate into apathy about
his research if he knew that a protected course for whistle blowers existed. Therefore, he
would be able to continue to see his act of taking the research job as a humanitarian effort.
The second causal excuse is the excuse from null cause which says that an
individual cannot be blamed because she is only a 'cog in the wheel' and it is not she who
makes the decisions, but rather those above her. Robert Jackall objects to this excuse
because the individual cannot remove herself from the causal chain just because she does
not "have the final say in a project, or because those who have more say than (she) does
are free either to accept or to reject (her) data." (72) The example Tong uses is that of
falsifying data. The supervisor o f a research project believes that he and his staff are
simply drawing lines and that what is done with the data is out o f their hands. Jackell,
who studied this example, says that the supervisor cannot be considered out of the
responsibility loop just because he does not have the final say. His input influences the
final outcome and is thus accountable as is he. (72)
Causal excuses for personal responsibility do exist, but they do not absolve the
individual. With the alternative cause perhaps something worse would have occurred had
the individual not done what she did. While Tong believes that the lesser of two evils are
at times morally excusable, I think she would be quite prudent in employing this excuse.
Null cause seems to me to be quite weak. Decisions should be based on all available data
and behind each piece of data is a person. If someone were to falsify data, as in the
example, or simply to take the stand that what she had done was merely a part of the
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whole and therefore she is innocent, the individual is not realizing that it is through many
pieces that the whole is formed and each of those pieces is responsible for the intellectual
and moral strength or weakness of the whole.
Volitional excuses for personal responsibility that may be employed are gauged by
how much an individual knew was involved in doing an act and whether she was able to
do or not to do that thing. Volitional excuses for personal responsibility do exist and are
based on two factors: the absence of intention and/or the presence of compulsion.
An act is intentional if it meets at least one of the following two conditions:
1. A person consciously desires the outcome o f his/her act, whatever the
likelihood of that outcome may be; or 2. a person knows (subjectively) that
the outcome of his/her act is practically certain to follow from his/her
conduct, whatever his/her conscious desire may be as to that outcome. (72)
When an individual acts intentionally, she can be held "at least partially responsible for the
direct or indirect harmful outcomes of (her) actions." (73) If, however, an individual
commits unintentional actions, she is less accountable for harmful outcomes of her
actions, and thus is eligible for a volitional excuse for her actions. Nevertheless, if there
are steps the individual could have taken which she did not, no matter how unintentional,
she can be held at least partially responsible for the harmful outcomes of her actions.
"Willful blindness is no excuse for lack of foresight." (73) Further,
(w)hen policy experts, or policy makers for that matter, make themselves
the 'instruments of their own ignorance' by blithely adopting the motto,
'See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil,' we excuse their lack of foresight
at the risk of encouraging an atmosphere of deliberate moral
benightedness. (73)
As I have read the U.S. foreign policy decisions with Iraq which followed the Iran-Iraq
war and have become more aware of how these decisions allowed Saddam Hussein and
the Ba'ath Party to rearm to continue what Samir Al-Khalil named a republic of fear, I
wonder where the foresight was in these decisions. Because of George Bush’s
experiences as CIA director, vice-president for eight years and then president, this
volitional excuse of absence of intention does not stand, (see chapters 3 and 4)

Another volitional excuse is one based on coercion. This coercion can be in the
form of physical force or psychological constraint or, to a lesser degree, may be physical
or psychological rewards. A policy analyst may be threatened with firing if she does not
produce the data necessary for a certain project. In like kind, an individual may be offered
a reward which may compel her to act in a way in which she might not necessarily act.
"Bribes are not necessarily less coercive than threats; kind offers that meet resistance
easily mutate into cruel threats." (73) When one works within a bureaucracy, one may be
subjected to coercion which emanates from the institution so while we may think that
through individual coercion people alter their actions, we see that also through institutional
coercion, pressure can be applied.
One kind of institutional coercion may proceed from the general structure of the
institution-what we might call institutional ethos: This does not mean, however, that
individuals are powerless within those institutions. There may be within an institution an
ethos of the institution (that) shapes in its employees 'a strong orientation
to their bureaucracy's goals, habits of careful calculation, and a distrust of
intangible issues of value which threaten to disrupt the calculated
achievement of goals.’ (74)
While the institutions or bureaucracies with which people are associated do in fact
mold them, these same individuals do not
sign a pledge to do everything in their power to make the institution bloom
and grow. On the contrary! The process whereby their consciences are
taken over by the institution's ethos is far more insidious than this for at
least three reasons. (75)
First, through the many equations required of a policy expert, policy maker, or politician,
the world may become merely 'numerate'-people and their activities merely quantified.
Second, the neutral language (bombs called 'ordnance' or bombings called 'interdiction')
of the policy work may cause a moral numbness. And third, due to the duration of
involvement in bureaucracy, the policy expert, policy maker, or politician may separate
herself from the consequences o f her actions, developing a sort of professional callous
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moral awareness.
The example Tong gives is o f a policy analyst who never came into contact with
those people for whom his decisions had a negative impact. Because of his distance from
these people, he believed he was not responsible for any harm that came to them because
"of his negligent, reckless, or intentional miscalculations." (75) I believe this can apply to
policy makers and politicians as well. The term ’collateral damage', meaning civilian lives
and property destroyed, has been coined as a result of this absence of awareness o f the
impact of policy decisions.
The reason that the bureaucrat can embrace this attitude of insulation is because the
efficiency o f bureaucracy is based on segmentation and specialization. Segmentation,
which breaks tasks into small parts, "separates experts from the final product of their
effort." (75) While specialization, which demands that an individual be an expert on one
narrow element of a problem, "separates experts from the use to which their knowledge is
put." (75) Even when the parts are put together to create the whole, neither "the team
leader nor the team members will have any clear sense about the fate of their report." (75)
This separation and specialization was masterfully conducted during the Manhattan
Project. For the institution, the U.S. government-national security, each part of the
project was both a whole project in itself and a piece of the whole of the atomic bombs,
and the agents in the project complied, many without knowing to the full extent what they
were finally creating. This example may, in fact, be one of an institutional coercive ethos
exacerbated by the demands o f a world war.
While bureaucratic structures work against ideas of personal responsibility, people
may be able to shape these "institutions so that their structures can support us in our
efforts to achieve the good life." (77) From Alasdair MacIntyre a distinction between
practice and institution is formulated.
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For MacIntyre,
(a) practice i s ... a cooperative human activity that has its own standards of
excellence.... If a n y ... practice (is) to flourish, then (its) practitioners
must appreciate those satisfactions or goods internal to (it). ...To enter into
a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy
o f my own performance as judged by them. It is to subject my own
attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which currently
and partially define the practice. (77)
Within a practice there are standards of excellence which include the virtues of justice,
courage and honesty. Practices are concerned with internal goods and are held together
with human cooperation.
Institutions are concerned with external goods such as money, power, and status
and "are energized by the fragmentary fires o f human competition." (78) This is,
according to MacIntyre, the way it ought to be "provided that 'the ideals and the creativity
of the practice' do not succumb to 'the acquisitiveness of the institution.'" (78) Although
institutions can support positive practices, they can also distort them.
Within bureaucracy, policy expertise is a practice. However, "(w)ithout internal
standards of excellence and without internal goods, policy analyzing, advising, and
consulting cannot develop into a mature practice." (79) Through standards o f excellence
and internal goods, policy experts can see themselves as just, courageous, and honest
people who can "create an institutional fram ework... that will permit them to make a
major contribution to the so-called good life... ."(79) Since policy makers and politicians
base many of their decisions on data compiled through this policy expertise, one would
think that they, too, would see themselves as just, courageous, and honest in the
application of these data.
Two recent examples of United States policy situations in the Middle East can be
examined using Tong's models of responsibility to see which hands are directing the
actions and to see whether or not responsibility or excuses appear. In the mid-1980s,
members of the U.S. government became involved in an event which came to be known

as the Iran-Contra affair. Following the cessation of combat in the Iran/Iraq war, United
States policy decisions concerning Iraq and business in Iraq aided Saddam Hussein and
the Ba'ath government in rebuilding the military might of their repressive regime. Tong's
explanations help develop an understanding o f these events and are discussed in chapters
three and four.
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ENDNOTES
1. Information in this chapter is based on Rosemarie Tong's Ethics in Policy Analysis,
chapter 4, "Dirty Hands, Many Hands, No Hands: the Policy Expert Within the Bowels
of the Bureaucracy." References are noted with parentheses and the page number, e.g.
(68).
2. Camus' assassins are found in the play "The Just Assassins" in Caligula and Three
Other Plays, by Albert Camus, (translated by Stuart Gilbert), New York: Vintage Books,
1962.

CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDY O N E:
T H E IR A N -C O N T R A A FF A IR
Within Tong’s models of responsibility many choices are available against which
the Iran-Contra affair can be examined. Are 'many hands' present thus clouding the trail
or so diffusing responsibility that identifying the accountable players is difficult? Are
individuals making decisions for the greater good against the evil they perceive whether
these decisions are legally or morally acceptable thus having 'dirty hands'? If they do
make 'dirty-hands' decisions, do they avoid responsibility through the excuse system
examined in Tong, or do they do what may be morally and legally wrong, but for what
reasons they see as for the greater good and accept the punishment, whether through
enforcement of law or through self-imposed guilt? When attempting to assign
responsibility, do the models of responsibility (hierarchical, collective, and personal)
apply, or does the excuse system available within each model seem more apparent? The
Iran-Contra affair is a canvas woven of many threads and the tools Tong gives us help
name and examine these threads.

M ANY HANDS
From 1980 to 1988, Iran and Iraq were engaged in war. United States' public
foreign policy toward the warring factions was one of neutrality. The U.S. government
wanted neither side to predominate; oil from the region was important as was the
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maintenance o f good relations with the Arab states. (Hunter 1988, 52) In November,
1986, however, a plan which is now known as the Iran-Contra affair became public in an
article in a pro-Syrian newspaper. In direct contradiction of a policy called 'Operation
Staunch’ which declared that arms would not be sold to the regime of the Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, the United States had been selling armaments to Iran. Soon it was
revealed that the sales were designed to aid in the release o f several United States citizens
who were being held hostage in Lebanon. Also,
(w)hen former National Security Council advisor Robert "Bud"
McFarlane, Oliver North, and others took th e ir... trip to Iran in May
1986, they were told by an Iranian official that the United States would
have to press Kuwait for the release of the Da'wa prisoners before U.S.
hostages could be set free by the Shi'a-allied Hezbollah in Lebanon.
(Armstrong 1990, 27)
This was a direct contradiction of what President Reagan had claimed when he said during
his presidential campaign that he would not deal for hostages. Additionally, the money
gained from the sale of these arms was used to support the Contras fighting in Nicaragua
to which in 1984 the Congress had voted to cut off aid. (Wallis 1989,23)
Robert Hunter asserts that the arms deal with Iran can be traced to two strategic
calculations. First, the Israeli government employed a 'periphery' policy with Iran
whereby Israel maintained good relations with the Iranian government. In order to
promote that policy, it was the Israelis who first suggested the value o f armaments sales to
Iran to the U.S. government. Then for the U.S., the arms deal could create an opening to
the Iranian revolutionary government. Strategically, Iran was important in the Middle East
and with the Carter Doctrine (later embraced by the Reagan administration) the U.S. had
pledged to defend the region (Hunter says this means Iran) from external threat (meaning
the Soviet Union) with all means necessary. (Hunter 1988, 49) The strategic importance
o f Iran included its population size, its oil reserves (second only to Saudi Arabia), the
border with the Soviet Union, its shoreline on the Persian Gulf, and its partial encasement

of the Strait of Hormuz which connects the Persian G ulf to the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian
Sea, the Indian Ocean, and then open waters.
Hunter believes these strategic objectives were and are sound; however, when Mr.
Reagan's attempt to convince the public failed,
the strategic arguments were not pursued consistently thereafter (and)...by
the middle of 1987, few senior officials in the United States were talking
about Iran's strategic importance to the United States and the West.
(Hunter 1987, 50)
Hunter continues that friendly Arab states viewed the arms sales with bewilderment. The
United States' substance and trustworthiness were questioned and a sense o f betrayal
existed by 1987.
Many individuals and governments with different agendas existed here. Even
within the United States government, different agendas existed. On the one hand, the
Congress had engaged in a policy, Operation Staunch, by which the Iranian government
would not be sold arms. Additionally, Congress had agreed that the Contras of Nicaragua
were not to be financed. In the meantime, Robert McFarlane, Oliver North and others
were selling arms to Iran and then funneling the money to the Contras. This transaction
hinged also on the release of U.S. hostages in Lebanon in return for the Da'wa prisoner
which was in direct contradiction of what President Reagan was saying publicly. Many
hands guided the plot of this affair. The questions remain if any o f these hands are 'dirty'
and who will assume responsibility for these actions.

D IR TY HANDS
In the dirty hands concept, an agent makes decisions which she knows are legally
or morally wrong because she acts for the greater good against the evil she perceives. She
may accept that she has dirty hands and repent or accept punishment as necessary, or she
may find relief from accountability through the excuses offered with responsibility.

I think those individuals who were involved in the Iran-Contra affair, in fact, may
have believed, and may still believe, that they were maximizing the greatest good-to-evil
ratio. Through the sale of arms, inroads to more moderate Iranians may have been made,
so the story goes. The proceeds from the sales, money which could not be procured any
other way, was available for the support of the pro-U.S. Contras. But what about the
idea o f moral versus legal? Are Camus' assassins a model for this situation? As Tong
says, there is no punishment for politicians or policy makers who break moral rules, but
what about those who break laws and still do not have to be punished? Oliver North
knew he had lied to a Congressional committee in August 1986, but he did not believe it
was unlawful. (Magnuson 1989, 23) How can this be? Perhaps it was a case o f his
believing the 'virtue', as defined by the prince, of insuring the state's security and well
being. What about applying the theory of Camus' assassins?
Would it be more moral, and thus more acceptable, if North and the others simply
admitted yes, they broke the law; yes, they did wrong, but then, like the assassins, take
the punishment? Jim Wallis in Sojourners magazine discusses the idea of civil
disobedience and Oliver North and his co-conspirators. He says, "When one breaks the
law for reasons of conscience, a crucial component of such principled civil disobedience is
a willingness to accept the consequences of one's actions." (Wallis 1989,23) Both M.K.
Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. followed this principle. Perhaps Oliver North saw
Congress' ban on arms to the Contras as an example of the evil administration which
M.K. Gandhi describes when he says
... civil disobedience is a necessary part of non-co-operation. ... An evil
administration never deserves ... allegiance.... A good man will therefore
resist an evil system or administration with his whole soul. Disobedience
of the laws of an evil State is therefore a duty." (Gandhi, 1951, 238)
Gandhi, however, has a responsibility attached to civil disobedience, and that is an
acceptance of going to jail. He says non-co-operators "seek arrest and imprisonment"
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(Gandhi, 1951, 172) to emphasize the valor of their cause. Jim Wallis points out North,
rather than taking responsibility, had done "everything possible to hide his actions and
shift the blame elsewhere." (Wallis 1989, 23) North is definitely not as morally
responsible as one o f Camus' assassins.
North is not the only player in this affair with dirty hands. Lawrence Walsh, the
special prosecutor who sifted through the many layers covering the players in this affair,
continued to ferret out who the players were, what they had done, and who was
responsible until President Bush pardoned them. As we look at the possibilities for
responsibility, some of these players will appear.

R E S P O N S IB IL IT Y M O D E L S:
H IE R A R C H IC A L , C O L L E C T IV E ,
PERSO NA L
As we can see from the many ramifications of this sale o f arms to Iran, nothing
happened in a vacuum. The hierarchical model is certainly one to be considered here.
Oliver North has testified "that these acts were either implicitly condoned or explicitly
directed by higher officials (and that he) 'was authorized to do everything that (he) did."’
(Magnuson 1989,22-23) For the hierarchical model to work, those who are superiors
need to assume responsibility. This has not happened in the Iran-contra affair.
In December 1992, President George Bush, who was vice-president during the
time of the Iran-Contra affair, revealed a personal diary which special prosecutor
Lawrence Walsh believes contained information relevant to the case. (Time, 1/11/93, 8)
Walsh also suspects that testimony from Casper Weinberger, who was awaiting trial in
Januaiy (Time, 1/4/93,11), would have contained information showing that he knew the
November, 1985, shipment of arms to Iran from Israel was in violation of the Arms
Export Control Act. (Doherty 1993, 325) On December 24, 1992, less than one month

41
before President Bush left office, he pardoned sue officials, two of whom had been
indicted and four of whom had been judged guilty of criminal conduct. (Wall 1993,75)
Those pardoned are Casper Weinberger, "former National Security Adviser Robert
McFarlane, former Secretary of State Elliot Abrams and three ex-CLA officials: Duane
Clarridge, Alan Fiers and Clair George." (Time, 1/4/93,11) North believes that, in the
case of CIA involvement, "’(e)very bit of that CIA responsibility had been passed on to
me,...'" (Magnuson 1989,23) so that while North would not accept ultimate
responsibility, he did believe it had been foisted on him.
In continuing to consider the hierarchical model, Tong says that this model is
unfair to both the superior and the underling. One suggestion she gives is that the
superior may not be aware o f the actions of the underling. This fact could be the case
with Oliver North. Perhaps his direct supervisors and the president did not know that he
was negotiating deals for hostage releases, selling arms, and directing the profits of the
sale to a military group Congress had voted not to support. However, this seems highly
unlikely. North has claimed that he was told by William Casey, then head o f the CIA,
Robert McFarlane, former National Security Adviser, and John Poindexter, National
Security Adviser, that his actions could not be revealed. (Magnson 1989,23) If they
knew enough to tell him this, it would seem they knew about what it was he was doing
that could not be revealed. With the charges against North dropped, his accusations
against Casey (who is dead), McFarlane and Poindexter will not be proven or disproven.
Also Tong asserts that this model denies the underling the opportunity for personal
reactions, positive or negative, from others for her actions. One negative outcome of this
is that the individual does not have the opportunity to use this critique to continue moral
development.
In the collective model, the collectivity as a whole is responsible for the decisions
made by the group. This Iran-Contra collectivity passed responsibility off to one another,

42
withheld information so that the investigation ran aground and was delayed, or believed
that they, in fact, did what was for the greater good as they saw it and for the most part,
unlike Camus' assassins, do not deserve punishment.
In the personal model of responsibility, the individual accepts responsibility for his
decisions and actions and accepts the consequences of them. Alan Fiers did come forward
in 1991, with information (Sun, 1 9 9 1 ,1[A]); he was pardoned o f any wrong doing by
President Bush. Robert McFarlane did attempt suicide shortly after the Iran-contra story
broke. Was this his attempt to accept personal responsibility? He was pardoned o f any
wrong doing by President Bush. Oliver North continues to speak around the country and
raise money for various organizations including a political action committee called V-PAC
(Com 1993,440) and to believe he is a hero despite testifying that he was responsible for
some of the crimes committed during the Iran-Contra affair. (Kornbluh 1991, 33) The
charges against him were dropped. Perhaps then the excuses used in these models of
responsibility are important in understanding the Iran-Contra affair.

EX CU SES:
CAUSAL, V O L IT IO N A L AND C O E R C IO N
The excuse from alternative cause may have motivated some of the decisions in the
Iran-Contra affair. It has been said that, had the U.S. not supplied Iran with arms, some
other country would have (and undoubtedly did) and the U.S. would have lost the
opportunity to negotiate the release of hostages. In a desire to believe as true what one is
doing, those players who said that this arms deal would open the door to more moderate
Iranians may have believed that if they did not take this opportunity that door would not be
budged again for perhaps a long time and that some other government would take the
U.S.’s place with these moderate Iranian individuals.
Also, the Contras were determined to continue fighting in Nicaragua, and their
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purpose for the U.S. was to fight Communism in the Western Hemisphere; therefore,
supporting the Contra effort was undoubtedly seen as a valid excuse for the illegality of
the decision. Had the U.S. not armed the Contras their resolve might have been broken or
another less friendly government might have provided the necessary supplies. Since the
establishment of the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. has worked to keep European countries
(and thus unfriendly forms o f governments) from gaining control o f Latin American
countries. With the advent o f the Roosevelt Corollary the U.S. has taken it upon itself to
keep order as it has seen necessary in Latin America. Perhaps the funding of the Contras
was an example o f keeping Latin America secure, especially from the establishment o f a
perceived communist government.
The excuse from null cause says that an individual cannot be held responsible
because he is only a 'cog in the wheel' who does not make the ultimate decisions. Since
in the case of Iran-Contra we have what has been referred to as a secret government
making decisions, I do not see how this can apply, especially to the principal players I
have mentioned. The players knew of Congress' decisions and decided to circumvent
them. These players are not cogs but rather active agents.
Can personal responsibility be excused in the Iran-Contra case? First, volitional
excuses of personal responsibility simply will not work here. Presently, I am unaware of
any o f the players who did not intentionally become involved, and, to my knowledge, no
one appears to have been overtly coerced. A case might be made that if there were
institutional coercion afoot within the National Security Council and the CIA at the time,
the implicit coercion to cooperate with the policy was so strong that to question or refuse
would have been seen as disloyal, perhaps unpatriotic, or lacking some other virtue. But
acting unintentionally does not absolve the individual because she is still responsible.
Tong reminds us
(w)illful blindness is no excuse for lack of foresight. When policy experts,
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or policy makers for that matter, make themselves the 'instruments o f their
own ignorance' by blithely adopting the motto, 'See no evil, hear no evil,
speak no evil,' we excuse their lack of foresight at the risk of encouraging
an atmosphere of deliberate moral benightedness. (Tong, 1986, 73)
As mentioned before, President Reagan's statements of not knowing what was going on
within his administration does not make me feel any better about this operation. If what
George Shultz says in his book, Turmoil and Triumph: M y Years as Secretary o f State, is
true, he worked at warning President Reagan about what was going on but to no avail for
the President believed what he wanted to believe. (Shultz 1993,45-46)
The revelation by former CIA officer Alan Fiers that he withheld information from
Congress about the diversion of money gained through the sale of arms to Iran to the
Contras and about Oliver North’s secret operation to resupply the Contras with weapons
in 1985 and 1986 makes me wonder how there could have been an absence of intention
and how since intention is present, the players can continue with clear consciences.
Perhaps their consciences have in fact been taken over by the three insidious reasons Tong
mentions:
First, policy experts can do only so many cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit,
and risk-benefit analyses before they start to see the world in terms of
dollar signs, or in terms of hedons (units of pleasures)... and dolors (units
of p ain ).... Second, policy experts can speak the neutral language o f the
bureaucrat only so long before a moral numbness occurs.... Third, policy
experts can stay buried in the bureaucracy only so long before they begin
to separate themselves from the consequences of their actions. (Tong,
1986, 75)
This may in fact be what has happened with the Iran-Contra affair. Given the Reagan
Doctrine of supporting any proclaimed anti-Communist regime, a separation of the players
from the consequences of their actions might have occurred as the Reagan administration
saw Congress’ unwillingness to fund the Contras as 'soft on Communism.’
Since President George Bush pardoned the primary players in the Iran-Contra
affair and since the crises of daily national and international life allow many people to
focus for only Andy Warhol's fifteen minutes on any given event, the intricacies o f policy

decisions influenced by this situation made during both the Reagan and the Bush
administrations might be known only to historians. The long-term ramifications of the
web o f these international policy decisions will remain, catching the flies of allies and
enemies as the international scene varies. Only when a critical juncture appears will
United States citizens become aware once again that some fissure between the government
of the United States and the government of some other nation has occurred. This
awareness will lack the complexities created during this time and will respond only to the
immediacy of the dilemma.
Through examining events such as the Iran-Contra affair, we can see how this
institutional coercive ethos can harm our country as well as produce distrust with our
allies. Furthermore, this type o f analysis explored here leads to suggestions for
institutional transformation which will be discussed in chapter five.
From 1988 to 1991, the United States government made policy decisions both for
government interaction and business investment in Iraq. Before Iraq invaded Kuwait on
August 2,1990, which created "the immediacy of the dilemma," the U.S. and many
countries which would later make up the United Nations coalition forces paved the road
on which Saddam Hussein, the Ba'ath government, the Republican Guard, and the
impoverished, terrified conscripts marched into war.

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY T W O :
U N IT ED S T A T E S -IR A Q
IN V O L V E M E N T , 1988-91

Just as the Iran-Contra affair can be considered using Tong's "Dirty Hands, Many
Hands, No Hands" criteria so can the policy decisions o f the United States with Iraq
following the Iran-Iraq war but preceding the Gulf War of 1991. For while the citizens of
the United States and perhaps other coalition nations were introduced on August 2, 1990,
to Saddam Hussein as the "new Hitler", "the satan of the desert", the vile vermin to be
exterminated, foreign policy decisions and business investments made from 1988 to 1991
created the tanks and trucks and conscripts who swarmed into Kuwait and the rungs o f the
ladders leading to cockpits of the bombers which flew the tens of thousands of sorties
over Iraq, shattering it back to a pre-industrial state.

BACKGROUND
Subsequent to the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. Department of Commerce published a
document prepared by the American Embassy in Baghdad which discusses what the
possible post-war opportunities for U.S. businesses were in Iraq. Remember that the
United States government was able to allow corporations to do business with Iraq because
the Commerce Department had, in 1982, removed Iraq from the terrorist list. (U.S.
Congress, Senate 1982,17) These post Iran-Iraq war opportunities were speculated for
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the years 1989-1998.

When this report was issued in 1988, Iraq was still engaged in a

war economy because there was no official cease-fire. Because of a steady decline in oil
prices, the higher earnings Iraq expected to realize in 1988, did not come to pass. The
Iraqi government found it difficult " to ... meet principal and interest payments obligations
to even favored creditors like the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and A ustralia."
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1989,4) The estimate of Iraq's external hard debt was
put at approximately $50 billion. Iraq owed
certain OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)
creditor countries, Eastern European and other non-Arab creditors over
$40 billion while as much as $8 billion of an estimated $30 billion to $50
billion received from Arab sources during the war was lent on terms
requiring repayment. (U.S. Department of Commerce 1989, 5)
As stated earlier, during the Iran-Iraq war Saudi Arabia and Kuwait sold relief crude from
the Saudi/Kuwaiti Divided Zone to aid Iraq's war effort. Those sales were halted in
December 1988. Other countries carrying large Iraqi debts, such as Japan, France, and
the Soviet Union, were having to reschedule debt maturities. This became increasingly
difficult for the non-Arab countries involved. Sixty percent o f Iraq's 16.3 million people
were under the age of 20. The country's inflation rate was estimated to be 40%. With
this in mind, what would be the future of United States' financial involvement with Iraq?
In 1988, U. S.’s exports rose sharply by 76 percent from $683 million in
1987 to nearly $1.2 billion while oil imports from Iraq rose by 205 percent
from $526 million in 1987 to $1.6 billion. (U.S. Department o f Commerce
1989, 8)
Agricultural commodities, such as rice, wheat, soybean meal, poultry, hatching eggs,
sugar, tobacco, tallow, pulses, butter and other dairy products, comprised over $1 billion
o f the U.S. exports to Iraq. This was "financed under insurance coverage from the
Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation." (U.S. Department of
Commerce 1989, 9) Major U.S. oil companies imported the crude oil, nearly 400,000
b/d, from Iraq. Exports from the U.S. to Iraq were financed while imports of oil were
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paid in cash.
The Commerce report suggests that
(t)he best prospects for American firms in the near term will include
agricultural products, health care products and equipment,
pharmaceuticals, oil field and refinery equipment, computers, and other
high-technology goods and services. These are products which appear to
be of sufficiendy high priority to obtain the necessary Iraqi Government
import licenses and foreign currency allocations. (U.S. Department of
Commerce 1989,15)
The implications for U.S. business continues with a list of other areas of investment such
as, iron, steel and aluminum works, fertilizer plants and a second petrochemicals
complex, and projects such as power plants, refineries, highways, pipelines and ports.
Projects that would benefit the Iraqi civilian population included public housing, health,
education, water, sewerage (a system of sewers), and electricity. This section o f the report
ends with
(t)he procurement of military hardware will continue to be a major import
item as Iraq replenishes its military hardware and attempts to maintain its
technical superiority through state-of-the-art weaponry and logistical
supplies. (U.S. Department of Commerce 1989,16)
This document concludes with a warning about Iraqi's adherence to the Arab
League boycott of Israel which might prevent some U.S. firms from doing business in
Iraq. However, there is also an address for information on U.S. boycott regulations
which indicates that it is not impossible to do business with Iraq.
An article appearing in The Christian Science Monitor (12 April 1991) is titled,
"Iraq Used US Loans to Finance Military Machine" with a subtitle of 'Washington
agencies charged with ignoring Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank warnings of the strategy.'
In essence, the article alleges that in a desire to "buttress US-Iraqi ties, officials of the
Treasury Department and officials of the US Agriculture, Commerce, and State
Departments ignored years of the Export-Import Bank's warnings ... in favor o f US
exports and financing to Baghdad." (1) The former Iraqi ambassador to Washington,
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Nizar Hamdoon, is quoted as follows: "In order to stabilize political ties you (United
States corporations) should start stabilizing the trade ties... Involvement o f US companies
should have a substantial impact on US-Iraqi ties." (Kaslow 1991, 1-2)
In 1988, Iraqi planners offered U.S. and other Western suppliers $35 billion in
postwar reconstruction contracts. In that same year, Iraq became almost completely
dependent on outside financing. It was over $80 billion in debt. While Ex-Im tried to alert
U.S. officials and business leaders to the problems of financing Iraqi ventures, "U.S.Iraq Business Forum chairman Robert Abboud, chief o f First City Bank Corporation of
Texas, led the lobby in Washington for official U.S. backing..." and "... U.S.
corporations—from Bell Helicopter/Textron to Westinghouse Electric Corporation—
'supported by State,' descended on Ex-Im and challenged its analysis." (Kaslow 1991,
2) Ex-Im continued to draw the same conclusions that even though it had large oil
reserves, Iraq might not pay its bills.

M AN Y HANDS
Moving into the realm of 'many hands' of businesses and departments involved
creates an unlikely trail to follow. As mentioned, the Commerce Department took Iraq off
the terrorist list in 1982, with the State the State Department following later that year;
somehow I thought perhaps Foreign Relations would have imput into decisions of that
magnitude. Even while being warned by Ex-Im Bank officers about Iraq’s probable
default on its loans, officials in the U.S. Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, and State
departments ignored warnings that Iraq would not repay. (Kaslow, 1991, 2)
Although the credit analyses of Ex-Im's board directed its path for loans with Iraq,
"the Agriculture Department's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) rejected" this
information and "doled out $1 billion a year in credits to Baghdad." When August 2,
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1990, arrived and Iraq invaded Kuwait, Ex-Im carried less that $50 million in loans while
the CCC is left with a $1.9 billion loss that the US taxpayer will have to absorb.
Indeed, many hands fashioned the decisions regarding U.S. involvement in post
war Iraq. Not only executive departments o f the U.S. government but also opportunities
for corporate investment guided this engagement. Later we will consider which of these
players assumes responsibility for the rebuilding of Iraq so that it can attack Kuwait or we
will see which excuses may apply. For now, though, let us see if any dirty hands become
apparent.

D IR T Y HANDS
Tong's discussion of Machiavelli's prince, who defines vice as anything that will
lead to a state's ruin and virtue as anything that will lead to a state's security and well
being, could be a starting point for the discussion of dirty hands. Perhaps the United
States redefined 'vice' and 'virtue' so that nation's greater security and well-being came
from the continued flow of Iraqi oil which increased from 1987 to 1988 by 205%. Or
perhaps the security and well-being of the country came from the financial success of the
many corporations that were encouraged to do business with Iraq. Interestingly enough
we need to remember that agricultural commodities to Iraq were financed by insurance
coverage through the Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation and that
in 1988, Iraq was $80 billion in debt and almost completely reliant on outside financing
while at the same time major U.S. oil companies were paying cash for Iraqi oil.
Perhaps, rather than the question of vice and virtue, this financial involvement in
Iraq might be seen simply as an example of doing the greatest good. The United States
continues to have oil and U.S. corporations develop markets. What could be the problem?
Why dirty hands? Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party were by 1988 notorious, as
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mentioned before, for creating what has been referred to as a reign o f terror for the people
of Iraq. Remember the gassing of the Kurds in the north which was reiterated during
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as an example. What does this have to do with dirty
hands for the policy decisions made during this time period? Through "the billions of
dollars Hussein received in Commodity Credit Corporations guaranteed loans, (he was
able) to modernize his militaiy." (Waller 1990,13)
In a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 15,1990,
eight U.S. companies are listed as having sold weapons or weapons components to Iraq,
five in 1989 and three in 1990. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1990, 49) In early 1990, "when
some senior administration officials were having second thoughts," the public policy
toward Iraq was that, "Hussein was an important component o f the Arab-Israeli peace
process and must be coddled diplomatically." (Waller 1990, 14) Thus the U.S. can have
'dirty hands' in an effort to court Saddam Hussein into the Arab-Israeli peace process
despite concerns raised about dealing with his government. As late as April 1990, even
after arresting Iraqi agents trying to smuggle U.S.-made capacitors and a British journalist
accused o f spying had been executed in Iraq, "the Bush administration instructed the Dole
delegation to convey a conciliatory message" to Baghdad. (Waller 1990,14)
By April 26, 1990, the issue of sanctions against Iraq was discussed as John H.
Kelly, Assistant Secretary o f Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of
State, spoke before the Subcommittee on Europe and The Near East o f the House Foreign
Affairs Committee. Because of increased criticism of Iraq, some members of Congress
were suggesting sanctions against Iraq. Perhaps in policy making this type of suggestion
is a form o f washing one's hands. Mr. Kelly rebuffed this, saying that the State
Department
believe(s) Iraq has clearly received the important message o f unanimous
US Government concern over its recent actions, and we are hopeful that
the government of Iraq will move quickly to bring US-Iraq relations back

to a more positive level. (U.S. Department of State 1990, 3)
The State Department further believed that without multilateral agreement the sanctions
would be ineffective. Kelly continuedby stressing that should the U.S. suspend trade
with Iraq other "competitors in Canada, Australia, Europe, and Japan would step in
quickly to fill the breach." (U.S. Department of State 1990, 3) This is the same argument
as used in 1982 when Iraq was removed from the terrorist list by the Commerce
Department. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982,17) On the issue of the import o f oil and the
export of other goods Mr. Kelly said,
Another result o f sanctions would be to worsen the existing imbalance in
our trade with Iraq. In the first 2 months of 1990, we imported Iraqi oil at
a level of some 765,000 barrels per day. If this rate o f purchase holds
through the year, we will buy at least $3.7 billion worth of oil from Iraq.
Our exports to Iraq last year amounted to some $1.2 billion, or roughly the
levels of the CCC and Ex-Im Bank guarantee programs combined.
For these reasons, the Administration continues to oppose imposition of
legislated sanctions. They would hurt US exporters and worsen our trade
deficit. I do not see how sanctions would improve our ability to exercise a
restraining influence on Iraqi actions. (U.S. Department of State 1990, 3)
This call for sanctions against Iraq is interesting since in both September and
October of 1988, the Reagan administration had opposed efforts to impose sanctions
against Iraq. At that time, sanctions were being recommended in response to Iraq's
abysmal human rights record with regard to the Kurds. August 25,1988, Senators Pell,
Helms, Byrd, Levine, Ford, Proxmire, and Gore introduced legislation in response to the
gassing of the Kurds. The Pell bill, as it was known, unanimously passed the Senate on
September 9,1988. The Reagan administration described this bill as premature and the
House of Representatives did not endorse it. Following a fact-finding mission to Eastern
Turkey September 11-17,1998, the Foreign Relations committee commissioned by
Senator Pell drafted their findings in a document called Chemical Weapons Use in
Kurdistan: Iraq's Final Offensive. This document was available in October 1988.
September 30,1988, Senator Pell and the other above-mentioned senators introduced and
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secured Senate passage of another, reduced version of the bill introducing sanctions
against Iraq. This bill was again rejected by the House. October 11,1988, a House-Senate
compromise version of sanction legislation was introduced by Senator Pell as an
amendment to another bill. The House conferees agreed to accept this version of the
sanctions and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was notified. On the last day of the
session, October 21,1988, the Reagan administration persuaded the House Foreign
Affairs Committee and the Ways and Means Committee to drop the Iraq sanctions
provision; the Iraq sanction were killed. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1990, 42-43)
Are there any dirty hands playing the cards concerning Kuwait during the time
prior to Iraq's invasion of the country? During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Hearing o f June 15, 1990, Mr. Kelly was asked about the status o f the dispute Iraq had
with Kuwait. Mr. Kelly answered saying that Iraq had asserted that it had historical
claims on Kuwaiti territory, which is a problem o f an indistinct border with Kuwait. He
said that in a letter to the Secretary General of the Arab League, Kuwait was accused of
transgressing "Iraqi territory and oil fields and of seeking to undermine Iraq's economy."
He continued saying that while the U.S. strongly supports a peaceful resolution between
the two countries,
(t)he United States takes no position on the issues in d ispute.... Our gulf
policy is unchanged: We remain determined to ensure the free flow o f oil
through the strait of Hormuz and to defend the principle o f free navigation.
We also remain strongly committed to defend the individual and collective
security of our friends in the gulf with whom we have deep and long
standing ties. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1990, 92)
This last sentence is perhaps a reference to the Carter Doctrine which was originally
embraced as a justification for retaliation against the Soviet Union should it engage in
conflict in the G ulf area. Thus with August, 1990, a mere two months away, the need for
trade within the Middle East, including Iraq, is reaffirmed, the requirement o f the free
flow of oil is stated, and the agreement to defend the United States friends in the gulf area
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is expounded. Is 'virtue' for U.S. policy decisions defined, then, as continued trade and
flow o f oil from a country whose government has a reprehensible history and which has
through U.S. complicity rearmed? Will those players with dirty hands come forward to
accept their fate as with Camus' assassins and thus accept responsibility for their decisions
or will excuses be more likely?

R E S P O N S IB IL IT Y M O D E L S:
H IE R A R C H IC A L , C O L L E C T IV E ,
AND PE R S O N A L
The information of U.S. involvement in reestablishing Iraq's military capabilities
seemed completely absent when the debate of Iraq's military threat rose to interest on
August 2, 1990, and beyond. Who would assume responsibility for the development of
this terror machine headed by Saddam Hussein who according to President Bush was
Adolph Hitler reincarnate? Who would remember that the development of this military
had been, at least in part, achieved through the billions of dollars of Commodity Credit
Corporations guaranteed loans. (Waller, 1990,13)
Using the hierarchical model, President George Bush, as the person on the top,
would ultimately be responsible for the transactions which occurred between the United
States government and corporations from the United States and Iraq from 1988 to 1990.
However, as a revitalized Iraqi army crossed into the Kuwaiti desert, not a word o f the
U.S.'s aid in preparing this army issued from Mr. Bush's thin lips; only "This will not
stand" was heard.
If we were to use the collective model of responsibility, then each corporation,
executive department such as Commerce or Agriculture, Congress, and the executive
branch of the government would be seen as a whole responsible equally for these policy
decisions. I do not recall any corporate executives nor any other representatives from any
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of the other entities coming on the news explaining how they were involved as a group of
government policy makers and business leaders in rearming Iraq thus giving Saddam
Hussein, the Ba'ath Party and the Republican Guard the capability to invade Kuwait and
inflict significant damage along the way. As far as personal culpability goes, none of the
above individuals has come forward either. How is it that these 'many hands' and 'dirty
hands’ can avoid responsibility? The excuses Tong explains may be of some help in
understanding this condition.

EX CU SES:
CA U SA L, V O L IT IO N A L , C O E R C IO N
The excuse from alternative cause is used when something is done because had it
not been done by that individual, or group, then some other individual, or group, would
have done it. Remember that by April 26,1990, some members of Congress were
expressing doubts about trade with Iraq and were raising the question of imposing
sanctions against Iraq. John H. Kelly assured the Congress members that Iraq had
received the important message about its government's behavior and besides, if the U.S.
did not trade with Iraq, other competitor nations would. (U.S. Department of State, 3)
This is the same argument, remember, that was used for taking Iraq off the terrorist list in
1982. In light of what followed from the rearming of Iraq with the money from cash paid
for oil, and given that Iraq's human rights violations were not a secret from policy
makers, this excuse is not admissible for the agents involved. Perhaps it is with hindsight
I am unable to understand how policy makers could approve rapprochement with Iraq, but
because o f this documented history o f Iraq's human rights violations as well as the more
recent concern expressed at the 1990 House subcommittee hearing, I find it hard to
understand or accept this excuse for these policy decisions.
In the film Judgment at Nuremberg, four Nazi jurists are on trial for crimes against

humanity, specifically sentencing individuals to sterilization, imprisonment, and death.
One of the defendants, a brilliant jurist who on occasion used his position as a Nazi judge
to save lives, initially refuses to recognize the authority of the tribunal. After a case in
which he sentenced an innocent man to death is brought before the court, he feels
compelled to make a statement. In his statement he explains how Germany and the
German people were dilapidated by despair prior to Hitler's infusion of pride. He testifies
that despite understanding the rough nature of Hitler's rule, he went along with the Nazi
party believing that it was a passing phase. Under Hitler's rule, Germany was able to
succeed as it had been unable to under a democratic government, and the passing phase
became a way of life. He states that the salvation of Germany depends on the telling of
this not-so-easy truth: The judges in Germany knew about the concentration camps and
they knew the ramifications of their decisions. They perhaps did not know o f the millions
who lost their lives, but they did know about the hundreds. If there were judges who did
not know the truth, it was because they did not want to know.
The defense attorney, in an attempt to lessen the impact of his client's statement
pointsout the complicity of the Soviet Union, the Vatican, and the industrialists in the
United States who rearmed Germany and profited from it. The presiding judge agrees that
others do share the responsibility of the success of Hitler and the Nazi party but that the
men on trial are responsible for their actions, which is what the trial is about. He explains
that if the men on trial and those who had been tried earlier had been maniacs or perverts,
then their actions would have been no more that a natural disaster. But because they are
ordinary, even honorable, people, they show how easily the drift to criminal behavior for
the protection of the nation can occur.
At the close of the film, the presiding judge goes to the prison to see the defendant
who testified that he was guilty. As their conversation comes to an end, the defendant
says, "Those people, those millions of people. I never knew it would come to that." The
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presiding judge responds, "It came to that the first time you sentenced a man to death that
you knew to be innocent."
What does this have to do with trading with a government notorious for brutal
behavior? If the United States did not deal with Iraq, then some other government, some
other corporations would. How could these corporations know how their products would
be used? The reign of terror in Iraq was not and is not a passing phase and those who
have done business, especially in the area of state-of-the-art weaponry, with the
government of Iraq have, just as the defendant did, sentenced innocent people to death.
And if they do not know the ramifications of their actions, it is because they do not want
to know.
Volitional excuses can be employed according to how much or how little the
players knew when making their decisions. Even if the corporate players did not
understand the ramifications of their investments, the government policy makers certainly
should have been aware. If, in fact, policy makers acted out of what Tong calls "willful
blindness," still no excuse prevails and as a nation as a whole we may have been placed
woefully close to "an atmosphere of deliberate moral benightedness." (Tong, 1986,73)
Could an institutional ethos of coercion have placed restraints on the policy
makers? In the area of institutional coercion, perhaps we do find elements o f the world
becoming merely numerate or those individuals making decisions separating themselves
from the consequences of their actions. (Tong, 1986,75) The transactions, whether for
oil, agriculture, building projects, or military technology, become simply so many
supplies and so much technology for so much money or so much money for the
government then to spend on so many supplies or so much technology. The long-term
implications of what those supplies or what that technology might create eludes the policy
makers. Since Iraq is geographically a long way from the United States and although
keeping the Middle East oil protected from the Soviet Union was a strategy concern, the
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real ramifications o f what would be created by the Ba'ath Party might have been beyond
the realm of realization of the policy makers. While I can understand how the economic
exchanges of nations can become merely numeral, I find this latter excuse quite hard to
consider, especially since the Bush administration used the atrocities committed by the
Ba'ath Party as partial justification for Desert Storm.
Tong discusses the policy expert who separates herself from the decisions she
makes using the example of the policy maker who never came into contact with those
whose lives were negatively affected by her decisions. Tong says bureaucrats like this
attitude because it segments and specializes tasks so that they are separated from the final
product of their efforts. No one is left with a clear idea o f the impact of her decisions.
(Tong, 1986,75) Could this be the feeling of all those who took part in the rebuilding of
Iraq after the Iran-Iraq war? Policy makers were not ignorant of Iraq's prior human rights
record nor of the means the Ba'ath Party and Saddam Hussein used to gain and maintain
power.
Although we have Tong's models for responsibility and the situations in which
excuses from responsibility can be used, neither has responsibility for enabling Iraq to
rearm to the level necessary to engage in the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf
War been accepted by the U.S. government and the business community nor are the
excuses for policy decisions acceptable given the guidelines for usage of those excuses.
Tong believes that through standards of excellence and internal good (see chapter
five), policy experts (and policy makers and politicians) can see themselves as just,
courageous, and honest. Where were these just, courageous and honest policy makers in
the years prior to the Gulf War of 1991 ?

CHAPTER 5

A C O N C L U D IN G SY N TH ESIS
AND S U G G E S T IO N S

C O N C L U S IO N

What does guide foreign policy decisions? Are they well-thought out, perhaps
applying the Native American principle of considering their impact for seven generations?
Are they principled with morals guiding them? Are they politically expedient applying to
the moment only, without thought for future ramifications? Are they secret, clandestine
actions? After looking at the Iran-Contra affair and the United States policy decisions with
Iraq following the Iran-Iraq war, most o f them seem to be "pragmatic", in the sense of
being practical, "opportune, for that moment" considerations. Each case appears to be
influenced by different components which then influence the course taken—so, generally
short-sighted.

IR A N -C O N T R A A FF A IR
In the case o f the Iran-Contra affair, the primary elements that appear to propel the
actions o f the agents are a desire to engage with moderate Iranians thus encouraging
dialogue between two countries that had been experiencing hostile relations, a need to free
U.S. hostages from Lebanon thus showing a determination to protect U.S. citizens in the
Middle East, and an aspiration to fight Communism in Nicaragua thus keeping the
Communist menace limited in the Western Hemisphere.
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For the success o f Iran-Contra, secrecy and lying were requirements; these
distinguishing features may, for the principal players, be defined as virtues since they see
them as necessary for the security and well-being o f the United States. Thus the players
have dirty hands "for the greater good", as they see it. Once the secrecy was broken when
the story appeared in the Syrian press, lying became even more important to the operation.
In a sense the players believed, and I think continue to believe, that what they were doing
was far more dedicated to their notion of national security than the decisions of the
Congress. Likewise they viewed the citizens of the United States as idiot wards of the
state who neither understood the importance of the situation nor could be trusted to be
educated about it nor trusted to make a politically savvy decision.
Trust in a representative government is one pillar maintaining the stability of
structure between the elected politicians and their representatives and the electorate. What
is interesting about Iran-Contra is that the majority of the main players are appointed
members of government, not elected. They perhaps felt free to compromise the trust of
the people of the U.S. because they did not have to worry about re-election. The electoral
process is still important for them. When their party is out of the executive office, they,
too, will be out o f a job.
This breaking of trust is, consequently, an example of employing dirty hands to
attain an objective. Elizabeth Wolgast states that utilizing dirty hands in a representative
government is more difficult to justify than one might suppose. Part of her reasoning is
that "(Relations of trust are a necessity of democratic life, not an optional good that can be
traded off, even for large future benefits." (Wolgast, 1992, 106)
Another character element about Iran-Contra that I find troubling is the herocelebrity status that particularly Oliver North has taken on. For some citizens, this could
be because they also believed that arming the Contras was worth any double dealing he
and the others may have had to do. For others, it could be that he resisted Congress and
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has essentially won. He is free; he makes large fees for speaking; and he is able to
influence other candidates through the PAC he formed. Maybe this adulation comes from
the notion that Congress itself is corrupt and makes infuriating decisions over which many
constituents feel they have no power.
...Kenneth Howard argues (that) government is also a context in which
individuals act, where some of their lives are carried out, and their
characters shaped (emphasis mine) for the better or worse. (Wolgast,
1992, 104)
What concerns me here is that even as our Republican leaders and their followers tout the
glories of 'family values' they have practiced deception without remorse. Wolgast
comments that officials "should not engage in unjustified 'dirty hands' behavior."
(Wolgast, 1992,104-05) and then clarifies, in a footnote, this notion especially with
regards to Iran-Contra by saying "this provision is important since it would preclude
justified 'dirty hands' behavior such misdeeds as those committed in the Iran-Contra
dealings o f the mid-1980s." (Wolgast, 1992, 105)
As far as considering the long-term ramifications of the Iran-Contra affair, I see on
the international stage problems arising from the perceptions o f other leaders that U.S.
officials or their representatives will 1) lie; 2) provide arms to governments which they
publicly proclaim to be their enemy; 3) deal, as in the hostage release, with hostile
governments and compromise their stated principles of engagement with those
governments; and 4) disregard even the law of their own nation as established by the
legislative branch of government. How are the U.S. government and its representatives
to be trusted in their international dealings given these four traits? I am sure phenomenal
distrust reigns in the international political realm, but this blatant disregard for one's own
political system cannot help but discredit the United States as a leading nation claiming to
display a functional democratic system, especially at a time when democracy continues to
be sought after by so many emerging nations and dissidents around the world.
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Additionally on a national level, I am concerned with the message about character
development that has been sent to the citizens of the United States. I think especially of
our young people. What are the long-term implications for them when they see a group of
politically important people lie, double deal, and break the law, and they are rewarded,
have their charges dropped, and are even pardoned by President Bush so that the
investigation o f their cases cannot be completed? Wolgast says that we have lost the idea
of this character damage that can be done by government. She says,
But in both Plato and Aristotle, one important duty assigned to government
was care for the moral well-being of the citizens, for improving them as
citizens and for not doing them harm - particularly moral harm. Indeed the
only harm that could be done one was to one's soul, one's character,
Socrates argued. (Wolgast, 1992, 104)
I believe that even after the notability of this case recedes into the recesses o f our collective
societal unconsciousness, the residue of this duplicity will continue to influence the
direction of the development for our national moral character - that, vaguely, we recall
going along with morally harmful practices as if they were "realistic".

U N ITED STA TES IN V O L V E M E N T
W IT H IR A Q : 1988-1991
For the policy decisions with Iraq after the Iran-Iraq war, the primary elements
seem to be to enlist Iraq's support in the Arab-Israeli peace process and to maintain a
possible ally against the Soviet Union, to land development contracts for U.S.
corporations for the rebuilding of Iraq, and to insure continued U. S. access to Iraqi oil.
With the hindsight of the Gulf War, I look at these policy and business decisions
made between the United States and Iraq. While the United States was not the only
country, nor the only Gulf War coalition country, to help rebuild Iraq after the Iran-Iraq
war, it was by far a major contributor and the leader of that coalition, and therefore its
involvement in the rebuilding takes on a special importance. Were these decisions made
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with clear and insightful thought for the future based on prior knowledge available?
If the United States had strained relations with Iraq from 1968 onward, and Iraq
was on the U.S. terrorist list until 1982, a clear record was available for the type of
government the Ba'ath Party created. While some players testified that Iraq's human
rights policies were improving, others cautioned that Iraq was operating a neo-Stalinist
government. I believe that enough is understood of the development o f human beings to
realize that for someone who has used terror tactics to change, a tremendous effort would
have to be made. As mentioned in the Iran-Contra section about the government's
responsibility in character building, even a quick look at the reign of the Ba'ath Party
would leave one understanding the horror inflicted upon many people living in Iraq. If
that were not enough, the gassing of the Kurds in the late 1980s was a vivid reminder. In
The Grammar o f Justice, Elizabeth Wolgast reminds us
...the good man becomes good by practicing-by repeatedly doing...what
is good; this doing good things seems very like the art that characterized
the good man; By doing just acts...the just man is produced, and by doing
temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no one would have
even the prospect of becoming good. (Wolgast, 1988, 84-85)
She goes on to comment how by this doing of good, a man's manner of doing good
becomes distinctive. (Wolgast, 1988, 85) Saddam Hussein's manner, his public record,
was not of someone who practiced at doing good. With him, I believe that just the
opposite was true. He practiced at doing evil, and he had other members of the
government and the military around him practiced at doing evil too.
I suggest it is this well-known disrespect for human rights that makes the
decisions of the U.S. government and therefore the corporations involved in Iraq a case of
dirty hands and dirty hands with no excuses to absolve them from having to assume
responsibility for their actions.
Many hands, of course, keep those agents involved safe from discovery or the
necessity actually to come forward and admit what was done. "The multiplicity of agents
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and o f their roles protects people in bureaucracies and insures that Nobody does what ever
is done." (Wolgast, 1992, 35) All players are safe and because this information about just
how complicit the U.S. was in creating the military might of Iraq is never as publicly
known as the anti-Iraqi propaganda which began August 2,1990, the citizens of the
United States are once again treated as though they cannot be educated (honestly) and
trusted to make a savvy decision. This lie is carried out as a lie of omission.
From a political perspective, I can understand the Cold W ar mentality o f needing
Iraq as a possible outpost for buffering the Soviet threat, and given the lethargy with
which the Arab-Israeli peace process had previously been pursued, I can understand how
the U.S. government might want to begin negotiating with the various players in the
Middle East. But what makes me sit and ponder are the contracts for U.S. corporations
and the access to Iraqi oil.
First, let us consider the oil. During the years under discussion and for the eight
years before that, there did not seem to be real political will for the United States to wean
itself from massive amounts of oil. Conservation was absent from most discussions.
Funds for mass transportation and research in alternative energy sources dried up like a
dry river bed during a drought. No leadership prevailed with the idea that as a nation the
citizens of the U.S. had to change their attitudes toward the use, over-use, and over
dependency on oil. Oil is a finite commodity, and it seems to me that as long as the U.S.
and her people refuse to adapt to that reality, dirty hands policies that will lead politicians
into deals with deplorable leaders will have to be employed simply to keep the oil
addiction supplied, until the rest of the world demands the same share for all of the people
(an impossibility) or the supply runs out.
I have been considering U.S. corporations in Iraq and the role of government. I
realize that if a country does not have diplomatic relations with the United States, U.S.
corporations cannot do business with or in that country. For instance, the United States
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has had an embargo against Vietnam since 1964. Why, with the Iraq's adherence to the
Arab League's boycott of Israel, were these politicians willing to negotiate around this? In
Citizens and Politics: A View from Main Street America, the view of most people in the
focus groups about who runs politics today was that
a select group o f power brokers is the ultimate decision maker on policy
issues-and not citizens. Included among the elite club are lobbyists,
political action committees (PACs), and special interest organizations.
(Harwood, 1991, 19)
Corporate influence on the Iraq policy would explain many decisions that were made.
Has a new oligarchy been created? Is this oligarchy led by the heads of corporations,
perhaps multinational corporations, who through PACs influence both national and
international policy decisions? How much money flows through Washington to wash
away any considerations o f the long-term effects o f providing a government such as the
Ba'ath Party with the ability to rebuild, rearm, and unleash terror once again? Remember
one of the reasons given for doing business in Iraq was 'if not us, then some other
country will.' In other words, short-term business profits outweighed the terror o f the
Ba'ath regime. Perhaps the only political benefits reaped were contributions to the 'war
chests' of politicians who supported these investments in Iraq.
During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, President Bush introduced the rhetoric, if
not the substance, of the Just War theory. During the war and since the end o f the war,
numerous articles and books have been written on whether the Gulf W ar was or was not
just, according to this theory, and what the ethics o f the war were. I believe that this
interest was prompted by the President's use of this language, and philosophers and
political scientists have had quite a time debating this issue. Whether the war has been
judged just or not simply depends on who one reads. I was surprised and heartened by
this outpouring of just war discussion. While this debate may influence future generations
regarding what constitutes a just war, for me at this time that notion is beside the point.

The point is that the United States was one of the major players in rearming a
notoriously heinous government, and then led the United Nations coalition to bomb that
same government back to the pre-industrial age when it acted in a very predictable manner,
after all, in 1980 that same government invaded Iran. Without U.S. assistance after
fighting a massive, labor-intensive, debt-producing eight year war, Iraq would not have
been as well armed as it was, and at that, especially once France cut Iraq's satellite
images, the technology of the two sides was grossly disproportionate. The coalition forces
knew where everything was in the desert and could navigate across the desert with
accuracy through satellite images while the Iraqis relied on airplanes which they either did
not fly or could not fly. (Celestial Sentinels, video)
Remember the important duty of government discussed in the Iran-Contra section:
care for the moral well-being of the citizens and that the only real harm that could be done
to someone was to harm her soul, her character. After the very typical enemy-making
process undertaken by the U.S. government and the media, demonizing Saddam Hussein
and dehumanizing the soldiers, for example, what followed was a glorification of the
infliction of suffering. This suffering might prick the consciences o f some policy makers,
but these 'dirty hands' were necessary to combat the Iraqi aggression. In After the War,
Bill Moyers discusses just how much joy was expressed at the bombing raids that were
produced to appear like video games without any reflection on the damage that could be
caused by tens of thousands of sorties. He also discusses the disproportionate amount of
celebration that followed the end of the war. None or few o f these jovial citizens were
aware o f the U.S. policy decisions that created the conditions for this war. Additionally,
to return to Citizens and Politics, the Kettering Foundation decided to hold more focus
group meetings in part to see if the United States victory had substantially changed the
U.S. citizens' views on politics. What they found was that nobody in the groups brought
up the war; the facilitators had to. Once the topic was brought up, the participants
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explained that they saw no connection between politics and war. One person said, '"I
thought we were here to talk about politics. That's the reason I didn't bring it up.'"
(Harwood, 1991, 66-67) And yet it is those same politicians making policy decisions that
form the politics of the country that set the stage for the Gulf War.
As with the long-term ramifications of the Iran-Contra affair, I believe that the
precedent set by the United States complicity in rearming Iraq and then building a United
Nations coalition military force to employ a massive strike to destroy that which it helped
create is debilitating to the development of the United States national moral character and
to the moral character of individuals in and out of government. Long after the "Support
the Troops" bumper stickers have peeled off the cars, citizens of the United States will
continue to believe that flexing military muscle is the appropriate response to the
dangerous world. Mr. Clinton's rise in popularity following the U.S. bombing of
Baghdad June 26,1993, can be seen as an example of this belief.

S U G G E S T IO N S
M ANY HANDS
Relying on 'many hands' to deflect responsibility must cease. As we have seen in
both the Iran-Contra affair and in the U.S.-Iraq involvement from 1988-91, the 'many
hands' notion applies. Regardless of who the players are or what agencies are involved
openness and communication among them must be emplace and operative.
An ethos o f communication in the sense of "communicare, to impart, share,...to
make common, " (Guralnik, 1980, 287) needs to exist among individuals working for the
various governmental departments, including the Defense Department and State
Department, and commercial enterprises. They must discuss and hear each other, even to
the level of having to examine close-held notions, such as arming the Contras or
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expanding loans, credits, and business in Iraq. In order to remove the 'many hands'
screen which deflects responsibility, the eventual policy decisions made must reflect back
on the discussions revealing the players efforts to co-ordinate and make policy decisions.
This process must be codified, monitored and made public so that not just the players
know of its existence but the citizens of the U.S. as well. Through this openness, trust
can be established; a trust that is essential for an effective representative democracy.

D IR T Y HANDS
For Machiavelli's prince, remember, vice and virtue are redefined so that "a vice is
that which ... would lead to the state's ruin; a virtue is that which ... would lead to the
state’s greater security and well-being." (Tong, 1986, 62) By following this line of
reasoning, a virtue may in fact become something which, if found in one's personal life,
might be defined as vice. Lying, for instance, to someone who relies on one's
truthfulness, perhaps a family member, would be seen as vice for it breaks the bonds of
trust which bind the family together. However, lying to Congress, a body which one
hopes relies on truthfulness, especially from players within government, became for the
players in the Irancontra affair a 'virtue'. This is an example of 'dirty hands' or working for the 'greater
good' as seen by the players. Why might the players have lied?
One component of institutions which compels the use o f the dirty hands rationale
is the institutional ethos of coercion, getting caught up in the narrow agenda o f the
institution without examining the long-term ramifications of policy decisions. Dirty hands
decisions are 'virtues' in that they might obtain the objectives of the institution's agenda,
but they are 'vices' in that they might, and probably would, break the trust necessary
especially in a representative democracy such as the United States. As Wolgast points
out, "(r)elations of trust are a necessity of democratic life ,..." (Wolgast, 1992,106)
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Institutions which govern in representative democracies as well as corporate
institutions which operate within representative democracies must critique and reflect on
any practices or beliefs that encourage and condone an institutional ethos o f coercion.
Because trust is central to the effective implementation of democracy, these same
institutions, whether government or corporate, must establish an ethos or moral habit
which is conducive and supportive o f the positive recognition and practice o f honesty,
responsibility, justice, and courage. Through acknowledging and rendering honor to
these equitable characteristics, the cornerstones for the foundation of a vital representative
democracy are laid.

IR A N -C O N T R A : R E V IE W
T H E N A T IO N A L S E C U R IT Y C O U N C IL
In considering the Iran-Contra affair, I have come to believe that in this post-Cold
War era covert operations by the CIA and the National Security Council (NSC) needs to
be reviewed. Created in 1947 as a branch of the Central Intelligence Agency, (Domhoff,
1967,127) the NSC's purpose was defined by the Cold War and the bipolar hostilities of
the United States and the Soviet Union. These institutions are especially susceptible to
both many hands and dirty hands which, given the secrecy in which they operate, are even
more hidden.
The end o f the Cold War has unleashed former recipients of U.S. covert aid to use
the weapons and training "against governments that America supports and against America
itself. (Schorr, 1993) Anti-Communist insurgencies, the Contras, the Unita rebels, and
the mujahideen guerrillas, are now engaged in acts of violence which the United States
does not support. In Angola, Savimbi has used his U.S. supplied weapons to reignite the
civil war and perform what is now called 'ethnic cleansing'. In Nicaragua, remaining
Contras violently oppose the government of President Violeta Chamorro. Factions of the
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mujahideen are suspected o f being responsible for "trying to drive tourists away from
Egypt by terror and bring down the Mubarak government," (Schorr, 1993) and are
wanted "for the shooting of five CIA employees ... last January." (Schorr, 1993) What
consideration, other than their being anti-Communist, was given prior to allocating funds
to these groups? How were the long-term consequences evaluated?
Elizabeth Wolgast suggests that the contexts of institutions are important in
influencing the more fundamental idea of what a person is. Perhaps if we, in a
representative democracy, "are to redeem the attribution of personal responsibility, our
institutions may need reshaping." (Wolgast, 1992,4) The agenda o f the National Security
Council and the means by which that agenda is realized need to be examined and perhaps a
new agenda established. Given the new international political environment in which we
find ourselves where notions of democracy are budding around the world, guidelines for
implementation of the National Security Council's agenda need to be discussed and
drafted. I would suggest that even the long-term moral implications of these actions be
included in the discussion.

U N ITED STA TES P O L IC Y D E C IS IO N S
W IT H IR A Q : 1988-1990
With regard to the U.S. policy decisions with Iraq prior to the Gulf War, I have
two suggestions. One involves the allocation of tax money for the implementation of
policy decisions. The other recommends an increased awareness and use o f human rights
as a criterion for policy decisions.

D E M O C R A T IC TAX
A L L O C A T IO N S
Much of foreign policy cannot be executed without funding, for example the loans
to Iraq through the Commodity Credit Corporation. Since 1977 the yearly Hyde
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amendment has prohibited the use of federal money to provide poor women with
abortions. (Rosenblatt, 1992, 96) This withholding o f federal funds occurred, in part,
because o f the revulsion of many taxpayers toward the act of abortion and their pressure
on their elected officials. Since the United States is a democratic country and one of the
definitions of democracy is "a form of government in which the supreme power is vested
in the people and exercised directly by them or by their elected agents under a free electoral
system," (Stein, 1984, 353) I suggest the government open up all areas of funding to the
choice of the electorate. I, for instance, have vehemently opposed the use of my tax
money for nuclear weapons, but I have no choice about whether my money was used for
them or not.
While I realize that this process could be quite cumbersome for the government,
especially at first, I believe that along with the yearly tax forms, citizens should receive a
check list on which they can designate the percentage of their taxes to be used for the
various functions government supplies. My model for this idea is from Working Assets ^
which uses a percentage of its profits for various social, justice, peace and environmental
groups. Each year, all those individuals who use Working Assets credit cards or long
distance service receive a ballot listing all of the organizations for their choices.
I see many benefits from this system. First, citizens will have the opportunity to
see exactly where their money goes. If they have questions about any entry, they can call
their representatives and ask about it. This would open a dialogue between the
representatives and their constituents. One concern the members of the focus groups from
Citizens and Politics had was that their representatives are out of touch with them and
have no interest in their concerns. (Harwood, 1991,31) Thi dialogue has the ability to
keep the representatives accountable for and to inform citizens about how our money is
used. Second, after a few years the use of our money would reflect what is important to
us. I, for instance, would want to help poor women to have access to abortions and I
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want well-maintained national parks. With this system, I would be able to know that the
percentage of money used for certain expenditures comes from my money. Third, I
believe this system would give taxpayers a sense of empowerment in their democratic
government for they would be saying how they want their money spent. Presently, if
someone does not approve of the way government uses her tax money, she has perhaps
five choices. She can live beneath the income level established for paying taxes, in other
words, live in poverty. She can lie on her tax returns and await discovery and
prosecution. She can not pay taxes as many o f the tax revolt people have done and also
await discovery and prosecution. She can pay her taxes, not appreciate where the money
is allocated and become cynical about the process of taxpaying and perhaps even the
political process itself. And finally, she can pay her taxes and feel guilty and ashamed
about how her taxes are spent. Wolgast states
(o)ne writer remembers that it is an important fact, a personal fact, about
people (who objected to the Vietnam war) that they were citizens o f a
nation guilty of war crimes and felt personally ashamed of actions they
neither committed nor commanded. (Wolgast, 1992,19)
They did, however, pay for it, and perhaps that is where some of the shame came from.
This plan to allow citizens to decide where their tax money is spent may sound far
fetched, but right now in the House Ways and Means Committee, HR 1870, the U.S.
Peace Tax Bill languishes. This "bill would allow people to redirect to nonmilitary
purposes that portion of their income tax that would ordinarily go toward military
spending." ("Peace Tax Bill Given a Hearing" 1992,27) The notion that U.S. taxpayers
want control over how their money is spent is understandable. In the case of abortion,
well-organized anti-choice constituents have prevented their money from being spent on
abortions; people who object to their money used for military purposes have introduced
HR 1870.1 think the benefits of this plan would greatly enhance our democratic process,
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allow people to feel more a part o f their government, and create a model for other
emerging democracy to follow.

H U M A N R IG H T S
Even before the United Nations Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna June
1993,1 had been considering the awareness and use of human rights as a criterion for
foreign policy. Unlike 'dirty hands' policies where it is acceptable to commit acts which
are in opposition to moral codes, considering the human rights records of governments
would lessen the possibility of rearming governments that commit heinous acts. In
December 1948, the UN ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In its thirty
articles, the declaration outlines the criteria for a much more just and humane world and
one in which democracy would truly flourish.
I believe policy makers and citizens, especially in democratic countries, need to
read, consider, discuss, and understand the concepts presented in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Then perhaps, Zbigniew Brzezinski's 1989 statement "that
the notion o f human rights (as) 'the single most magnetic political idea of the
contemporary time'" (Forsythe 1992,40) could come to fruition. At the Vienna
conference, some nations posited the idea that perhaps their cultural identity or religious
practices were violated by this declaration. I agree with U.S. Secretary of State Warren
Christopher's statement to the conference that
(w)e respect the religious, social, and cultural characteristics that make
each country unique. But we cannot let cultural relativism become the last
refuge of repression.
...We reject any attempt by any state to relegate its citizens to a lesser
standard of human dignity. (Christopher, 1993,4-5)
When I first considered human rights as important to policy decisions, I thought
about how we could really be aware of human rights violations as well as the
improvements countries might make with regards to human rights. My suggestion was,
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and still is, that through representatives from all UN nations, along with non
governmental groups such as Amnesty International and Americas Watch, working
groups will meet at least yearly to review each nation's record. The groups would rotate
so that no "good old boy" clubs could develop to beat other nations over the head. Each
group should have a balance from each hemisphere as well as from developed and
developing nations. In Faces o f the Enemy, Sam Keen says "Confucius claimed we could
have harmony in society if we named things accurately." (Keen, 1986,96) I believe this
naming of abuses as well as successes would be very powerful and would contribute
significantly to the moral development not only of other countries but also of the United
States. I am encouraged that at the Vienna conference the establishment of a UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights was introduced and that the United States government
supports this action. (Christopher, 1993, 6)
I realize that much dirty dealing, what has been referred to in this paper as dirty
hands, goes on in international politics. Billions of dollars were paid to Iraq for oil while
allowing Iraq to buy products and technology with loans. In the Iran-Contra affair,
government players acted as though they were above the law as they sold arms to an
acknowledged enemy of the United States. They used the profits from these arms sales to
finance a rebel movement in Nicaragua that Congress had voted not to aid. However, in
"Human Rights in a Post-Cold War World," David P. Forsythe enumerates the
percentages of support for various treaties that further develop the notion o f human rights
and he says, "(t)he broad acceptance of international legal obligations pertaining to human
rights by a clear majority of the world's states suggests a recognition o f the basic concept
o f such rights." (Forsythe 1992,41) He continues by explaining the paradoxes and
hypocrisies apparent in the implementation of human rights by many nations, including
the United States. These difficulties while present are not defeating. The reality is that
human rights are being discussed, considered, and named as important in the international
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realm. To refer back to Confucius, he said it is through naming things accurately that we
could bring harmony to society. (Keen, 1986, 96)
If what Mr. Christopher said in Vienna is a true reflection of the Clinton
administration, "reinforcing democracy and protecting human rights (as) a pillar o f our
foreign policy -- and a major focus of our foreign assistance programs," (Christopher,
1993,1) then according to this speech, the Clinton administration has linked democracy
and human rights as inseparable. Mr. Christopher extolled that his "delegation will
support the forces of freedom ... every day in the conduct of our foreign policy
throughout the world. " (Christopher, 1993, 2) As we remember that what motivates me
to want human rights as a focal point for policy decisions for the U.S. is that the U.S.
rearmed Iraq even with its questionable human rights record, Mr. Christopher continues,
(w)e will insist that our diplomats continue to report accurately andJully
(emphasis mine) on human rights conditions around the world. Respect
for human rights and the commitment to democracy-building will be major
considerations as we determine how to spend our resources on foreign
assistance. And we will weigh human rights considerations in trade
policy... (Christopher, 1993, 8)
I am not naive enough to believe that this speech will cause the U.S. to disengage
in dirty dealings; there are too many political favors to pay and too much money to be
made. In order for a significant change to occur in the United States policy decisions
internationally, the U. S. needs to develop a national political will for human rights.
Just as the UN has suggested a High Commissioner for Human Rights, the U.S.
too should have a High Commissioner for Human Rights. Then similar working groups
formed from each of the states, Washington, DC and Puerto Rico would become wellversed on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights documents
and examine how each state and its inhabitants provide for these rights and how they
might violate them. Again, it is through the process of naming these rights and becoming

familiar with them on a national level that the United States federal government would
truly have the opportunity to use human rights as criteria for foreign policy and trade
decisions.
Following the Gulf War, Mr. Bush talked extensively about the creation of a new
world order. I do not believe we need a new world order. What we do need is a new
world vision, and my suggestions presented in this paper are, perhaps, part of that new
world vision.
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END NOTES
1. For more information about Worlking Assets call 1-800-788-0898 or write Working
Assets, 701 Montgomery Street #400, San Francisco CA 94111.
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